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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht 11-
reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council 
I 
(i) Emphasising the crucial importance of WEU's contribution which must give the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference clear and coherent guidelines on the place of security and defence questions in Euro-
pean and transatlantic relations; 
(ii) Convinced therefore that the Council's contribution cannot be limited to a re-examination of the 
declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Maastricht Treaty but must include an in-depth 
assessment of its experience regarding the application of Article J .4, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Maastricht 
Treaty and its repercussions on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and conclusions to be 
drawn from this; 
(iii) Taking into account the persistence of major differences over the political goals of an enlarged 
Europe and the place it should occupy in international relations; 
(iv) Consequently believing that the main goal of WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference must be to strengthen and improve the European structures involved in the area of defence 
policy in order to enable them to guarantee security more effectively, more democratically and with grea-
ter transparency; 
(v) Affmning furthermore that the Assembly remains attached to the effective implementation of the 
commitment entered into in the modified Brussels Treaty by all WEU member countries which agree to 
" promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe "; 
(vi) Stressing nevertheless that there are several ways of advancing European integration, of which 
merely merging WEU and the European Union is not necessarily the best for increasing security in Europe; 
( vii) Noting in particular that the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference is being pursued 
in a context of growing divergence between the West and Russia on a large number of questions that 
concern European security; 
(viii) Believing moreover that the deterioration of the conflict in the Balkans and the problems raised by 
maintaining peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean region will continue to preoccupy Ameri-
can and European allies; 
(ix) Judging therefore that it would be dangerous to use the 1996 intergovernmental conference to test 
the functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence and thus risk jeopardising its political and 
operational effectiveness and its function as the European pillar of NATO; 
(x) Convinced that given its specific character and its complexity, the implementation of a common 
defence policy makes it necessary, for a transitional period at least, to maintain an intergovernmental deci-
sion-making process based on consensus between member states, without the intervention of the Com-
mission or the European Parliament; 
(xi) Convinced in this connection that parliamentary supervision of European defence policy, which is 
based on decisions taken by the member states, must be guaranteed exclusively by a parliamentary 
Assembly composed of delegations of the national parliaments of the member states; 
(xii) Recalling that closer co-operation between the Assembly ofWEU and the European Parliament, as 
encouraged by the Council, has proved impossible because of the European Parliament's refusal to base 
such co-operation on the principle of reciprocity, respect of the responsibilities of both and recognition of 
the WEU Assembly as an integral part of the development of the European Union; 
(xiii) Believing that the aim of possible co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and the European 
Parliament cannot be some form of merger between the two institutions, but should lead to a precise defi-
nition and recognition of their respective powers and responsibilities which, far from being in conflict 
with one another, are complementary, so that democratic supervision in Europe may be exercised by 
bodies that are truly representative and efficient; 
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( xiv) Believing furthermore that for as long as the member countries of WEU and the European Union 
and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are not identical and WEU is not fully operational, no 
merger of any kind between WEU and the European Union will be desirable or feasible; 
( xv) Believing also that all attempts so far in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty to amalgamate the 
responsibilities of community and intergovernmental institutions in the area of the CFSP have not proved 
successful, hence the more reason for avoiding them in defence matters; 
(xvi) Convinced, on the other hand, that everything must be done to facilitate consensus between mem-
ber states in defence matters instead of disturbing them with the prospect of their possibly being put in a 
minority position; 
(xvii) Wishing therefore that the drafting of the white paper on European security will serve mainly to 
bring closer together the points of view and interests of the member countries and achieve fuller European 
integration in these areas; 
(xviii) Regretting the" wait and see" attitude prevailing generally in WEU arising from the provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty stipulating that any initiative in foreign policy and security matters with defence 
implications must emanate from the European Union, an institution which includes five non-member 
countries of WEU and which has less experience than WEU in this area; 
(xix) Recalling, however, that the variable configuration of the Council of WEU allows the points of 
view of all associate members, associate partners and observers to be taken into account, without the 
latter being able to block any consensus that may have been reached by the ten full members; 
(xx) Wishing therefore- as the United Kingdom Government memorandum of 1st March 1995 proposes-
" that future European defence arrangements should be based on ... WEU " and for the latter thus to beco-
me capable of providing the necessary political impetus to the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance; 
(xxi) Furthermore supporting unreservedly the United Kingdom proposal that the heads of state and of 
government meet regularly in the framework of WEU to establish general guidelines concerning collective 
military action envisaged by Europeans; 
(xxii) Believing that the Chairmanship-in-Office should not be the sole authority for giving impetus to the 
work of the Council and recalling in this connection its various recommendations for strengthening the 
functions and power of the Secretary-General of WEU and the participation of the Assembly; 
n 
(i) Welcoming the conclusion of a stability pact in Europe with the aim of facilitating the progressive 
rapprochement between the Central European countries on the one hand and the European Union and 
WEU on the other; 
(ii) Welcoming also the fact that the European Union is preparing to conclude Europe agreements with 
the three Baltic countries and with Slovenia; 
(iii) Wishing WEU to strengthen the working relationship it has established with the associate partner 
countries as a whole and to create the same kind of relationship with Slovenia; 
(iv) Expressing astonishment at the terms of paragraph 6 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 565 
which states that " The question of granting Slovenia associate partner status will be kept under review as 
Slovenia's relationship with the European Union develops ", whereas the Council fixed no similar condi-
tion for granting this status to the nine countries mentioned previously; 
m 
( i) Noting with interest the content of the two parts of the fortieth annual report of the Council to the Assem-
bly, especially the detailed information it gives on the activities of the various working groups of the Council; 
(ii) Regretting nonetheless the lack of political direction of this report which is the essential basis for 
the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly; 
(iii) Noting furthermore that the annual report provides no information on the Council's experience 
regarding the implementation of a working relationship between the subsidiary organs of the Council on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, the CFSP institutions and the European Commission or on procedures 
adopted in this connection; 
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( iv) Wishing, in the face of the new risks threatening European security and the problems raised by the 
preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference, for a considerable improvement in co-operation, 
co-ordination and reciprocal exchange of information between the Council and the Assembly; 
(v) Deeply regretting therefore that the Council has decided to organise an important conference in 
Washington in June in the context of its transatlantic publicity relations activities, with a wide participa-
tion of WEU ministers, at exactly the same time as the Assembly is holding the third part of its fortieth 
ordinary session and expressing surprise that the Council of Ministers, at its meeting in Lisbon, did not 
take this opportunity to express its regret regarding this clash of events; 
(vi) Finding it intolerable that certain documents produced by the WEU ministerial organs are not trans-
mitted to the Assembly, whereas they are published by the services of the European Parliament; 
(vii) Astonished that the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) is not included in the organo-
gram of the ministerial organs as this was transmitted to the Assembly in 1994, and that the annual report 
makes no reference to the tasks and activities of the Verification Group referred to in that organogram, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I 
1. Between now and the end of 1995, make: 
(a) an assessment of its experience regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Maas-
tricht Treaty concerning WEU and its repercussions on the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty; 
(b) an assessment of its experience concerning relations between WEU and NATO; 
2. Prepare from these assessments a concept for developing its relations with the European Union and 
NATO, paying particular attention to its future relations with the European member countries of the Atlan-
tic Alliance which have now become associate members of WEU and transmit such assessment to the 
Assembly for early comment; 
3. Take into account the memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's approach to the treat-
ment of European defence issues at the 1996 intergovernmental conference, dated 1st March 1995, as well 
as that of the Netherlands Government on the CFSP, dated 30th March 1995, or proposals of other mem-
ber governments to develop a common position of WEU countries in the framework of the preparation of 
this conference; 
4. Arrange to be represented on the group of experts established by the European Council and ensure 
that all questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty are dealt with exclusively by 
the signatory countries of that treaty and its protocols; 
5. Ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference results in WEU being recognised as an organi-
sation authorised to act on behalf of the European Union in security and defence matters and that member 
countries of the European Union which are not members of WEU cannot block consensus achieved within 
WEU in this area; 
6. On the basis of the white paper on European security, develop a medium-term concept of the crite-
ria, procedures and even the stages that should be adopted for placing the common defence policy on a 
new legal and institutional basis subsequently enabling defence questions to be set in the framework of the 
European Union; 
7. Agree that such an undertaking should be achieved within approximately ten years and use this per-
iod to examine how far the modified Brussels Treaty should be revised and adapted to the new situation 
with a view to presenting proposals to another intergovernmental conference which might be convened at 
the end of the period mentioned above; 
8. Include in this medium-term concept provisions providing for more representative parliamentary 
supervision at European level, in particular by transfoiming the existing WEU Assembly into a second 
chamber, alongside the European Parliament thus confirming the role of delegations from national parlia-
ments, with responsibilities that are different from and complementary to those of the European Parlia-
ment; 
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9. Not compromise, as matters now stand, the close co-operation between WEU and NATO by open-
ing hastily WEU's doors to organs of the European Union but maintain the procedure for reciprocal 
exchange of information on the respective activities of these organs and WEU; 
10. Manifest more clearly its will to meet its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and leave no doubt, in its relations with other European and Atlantic authorities, about the fact that the 
WEU Assembly is the sole Assembly with responsibility in security and defence matters in accordance 
with an international treaty; 
11. Take the necessary steps to give the Secretary-General of WEU the right of initiative, in particular 
the right to convene the Council of Ministers and the right to participate in meetings of the Council of the 
European Union and the European Council, when the latter examine questions connected with the CFSP; 
12. Hold more frequent meetings, particularly before the meetings of ministers responsible for the 
CFSP, in order to give them the necessary impetus; 
13. Take up the United Kingdom proposal to organise WEU summit meetings on the occasion of meet-
ings of the European Council; 
14. Accelerate efforts to make WEU fully operational; 
11 
1. Offer Slovenia the same status as that enjoyed by WEU associate partner countries; 
2. Strengthen relations both with the associate partner countries as a whole and with Slovenia by 
taking the measures that are required to enable them to participate fully in developing a European secur-
ity system; 
3. Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference results in a revi-
sion of the articles of the Maastricht Treaty so as to allow WEU to invite European countries which are 
members of NATO but not members of the European Union to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty; 
m 
1. Ensure that henceforth the annual reports of the Council contain more political substance and also 
set out the nature of the difficulties that the Council is having in achieving its objectives, with a view to 
stimulating fruitful dialogue with the Assembly; 
2. Fulfil the undertaking it gave in its reply to Recommendation 565 to ensure that it keeps the Assem-
bly informed as a matter of priority through its annual report on the areas and substance of its co-opera-
tion with the European Union and NATO; 
3. Explain upon which provision of the modified Brussels Treaty is based the decision of the Mediter-
ranean Group, as set out in the second part of the fortieth annual report, to " continue to make clear to its 
Maghreb and Egyptian interlocutors that in the dialogue between these countries and WEU, WEU was 
competent to address only politico-military and defence questions, the other issues coming within the pur-
view of institutions such as the CSCE (now OSCE) and the European Union "; 
4. Inform the Assembly of the content of the document prepared by the European Union authorities on 
the implications of the situation in the Mediterranean for European security, to which the Permanent 
Council of WEU contributed, as it emerges from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 565; 
5. Ensure in future that the organs mentioned in the organogram of the ministerial organs transmitted 
to the Assembly correspond to those on which the Council informs the Assembly in its annual report; 
6. Inform the Assembly of the tasks and activities of: 
(a) the Verification Group; 
(b) the Military Delegates Group; 
7. Take the appropriate measures to improve co-ordination of its activities with those of the Assembly 
and transmit to the Assembly its documents which are unclassified. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mrs. Aguiar, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. As 1996 approaches, at the start of which 
the intergovernmental conference is to be opened 
on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the ques-
tion being raised ever more frequently is what 
strategy the WEU Council is to adopt, in the fra-
mework of its contribution to this conference, on 
the outcome of which will depend the future of 
WEU as a whole, and in particular that of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. The programme of the Portuguese presi-
dency of the Council of WEU, communicated to 
the Assembly on 30th January 1995 1 identifies 
two major issues in this context: "the common 
evaluation of European security, including the 
French proposal for a white paper, and the institu-
tional implications for WEU for a European secu-
rity and defence identity". It goes on to state in 
this connection: 
" In our reflection on European security we 
should identify common objectives, risks 
and threats, as well as the means we have at 
our disposal to face them. Our attention 
could then be directed towards answering 
the questions raised during this frrst phase 
of our work. This will include the need to 
address highly sensitive and complex insti-
tutional matters. 
After consultation with all delegations, 
Portugal has come to the conclusion that it 
would be better to concentrate on the frrst 
of the elements I have just mentioned, lea-
ving the discussion on institutional matters 
to the seminar of senior officials which is 
due to take place in Portugal in early 
June. " 
3. It is precisely at the beginning of June that 
the group of experts established by the European 
Union will begin its work on the institutional 
aspects of a revision of the parts of the Maastricht 
Treaty which are to be renegotiated at the intergo-
vernmental conference on the basis of reports to 
be submitted to it between now and June by the 
principal institutions of the Union, namely, the 
European Commission, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the European Parliament. As to 
the possible revision of Article J.4 of Title V of 
the Maastricht Treaty on the common foreign and 
1. Document A/WEU/DG (95) 2. 
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security policy (CFSP) which will deal primarily 
with the future role ofWEU, it should be recalled 
that this is to be undertaken on the basis of a 
report on this matter which only the Council (of 
the European Union) will submit to the European 
Council (see paragraph 6 of Article J.4). Conse-
quently neither the Commission nor the European 
Parliament are supposed to be involved in prepa-
ring a revision of Article J.4. Nevertheless this has 
not prevented the European Parliament from 
making the question of the future role of WEU 
one of its main preoccupations 2• The same holds 
true for the contributions of the European Com-
mission which has asked a group of experts to 
prepare an assessment of Title V of the Maastricht 
Treaty, dealing specifically with relations bet-
ween the CFSP and WEU 3• 
4. Conversely, in all probability, there will be 
no contribution from the WEU Council by the 
time the European Union's group of experts starts 
its work. It should be noted in this connection that 
one of the idiosyncrasies of the Maastricht Treaty 
is that no preparatory role has been assigned to the 
WEU Council in the framework of a revision of 
the provisions of Article J .4 which specifically 
concern WEU, although in the declaration 
annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht the WEU 
member countries admittedly stated that in 1996 
WEU would make its own re-examination of the 
present provisions. But Article J.4, paragraph 6, 
of the Maastricht Treaty makes no reference to 
this declaration. 
5. It is therefore crucial for the WEU Assem-
bly to present its ideas in broad outline between 
now and June, following the direction already 
marked out in the report by Mr. Soell on a Euro-
pean security policy 4, further to which the Coun-
cil, in its reply to Recommendation 565: "fully 
subscribes to the view expressed by the Rappor-
teur that ' this report can be regarded as an initial 
contribution to the preparation of the intergovern-
mental conference ... ' and has taken note of the 
report with great interest. " 
2. See for example the reports by MM. de Gucht, Bour-
langes, Martin (Committee on Institutional Affairs) and MM. 
Poettering, Crespo and Matutes (Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Security and Defence Policy). 
3. See the initial report on European security policy towards 
2000: ways and means to establish genuine credibility, 19th 
December 1994. 
4. Document 1439. 
6. The Council states in the second part of its 
fortieth annual report to the Assembly 5 that the 
Assembly's contribution to the institutional debate 
" which will be at the heart of the review of the 
WEU Maastricht declaration, a debate in which 
the Assembly's contribution is both welcome and 
most necessary". The Assembly is quite prepared 
to contribute to this debate but in return expects 
not only to be heard by the Council and its mem-
ber governments but also to obtain their backing. 
In this connection the Assembly noted with satis-
faction the content of paragraph 15 of the Noord-
wijk declaration, which states that " Ministers 
acknowledge the constructive contributions from 
the Assembly to the further strengthening of 
European security ". It welcomes the fact that, in 
the Lisbon declaration of 15th May 1995, the 
Ministers of the WEU Council underlined the 
importance they attached to the role played by the 
Assembly in the debate on security and defence in 
Europe and its substantive contribution to the 
wider consideration of these issues. If this ack-
nowledgement is not to be just an empty shell, it is 
essential for the governments of WEU member 
countries to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference achieves a result enabling the 
Assembly of WEU to continue its constructive 
work, even beyond 1998. 
II. What is at stake? 
7. It is no accident that the European govern-
ments chose 1996 to convene a conference for 
reviewing the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
on the common foreign and security policy. 
According to the interpretation being given to the 
modified Brussels Treaty by the governments 
concerned (which has been challenged by the 
Assembly ofWEU), fifty years after the entry into 
force in August 1948 of the treaty of economic, 
social and cultural collaboration and legitimate 
collective self-defence, each WEU member coun-
try will be entitled to submit a declaration to 
Belgium, the depository power of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, notifying its intention to cease to 
be a party to the treaty provided it has previously 
given one year's notice (Article X of the 1948 
Brussels Treaty). 
8. It should nevertheless be recalled that 
WEU was not created by the abovementioned 
treaty, but by the protocol modifying and comple-
ting the Brussels Treaty, signed in Paris, on 23rd 
October 1954, which came into force on 6th May 
1955. It should also be recalled that this protocol 
fundamentally changed the spirit and objective of 
the 1948 treaty by creating, for the first time, a 
defensive European alliance bringing together 
countries which had been on opposing sides 
5. Document 1453, 30th March 1995. 
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during two world wars, and that the aim of this 
new treaty was, moreover, to promote the unity 
and to encourage the progressive integration of 
Europe many years before the Treaty of Rome, 
creating the European Communities, saw the light 
of day. WEU was in fact the first to start imple-
menting these aims. There is therefore no justifi-
cation for claiming that it was only "with the 
merging of the Treaties of the European Commu-
nities and then with the creation of the European 
Union, which has brought WEU inside the pro-
cess of European integration 6 ", as stated in the 
study by the European Strategy Group and the 
Institute for Security Studies of Western European 
Union, published in March 1995. 
9. In placing the emphasis on a" 1998 dead-
line " as the main reason for revising the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the signatory countries are subjec-
ting themselves to an artificial pressure of time, 
since in reality there is no dead-line. Indeed, the 
governments were fully aware that the modified 
Brussels Treaty would not be terminated automa-
tically after expiry of the fifty-year period and that 
there is no valid reason for denouncing this treaty, 
which has only begun to secure advantages and 
yield concrete benefits since the signatory coun-
tries have at last decided to made use of it. On the 
contrary, denunciation of the modified Brussels 
Treaty would be as dangerous an undertaking as 
the termination of the Treaty of Washington in 
1969, twenty years after it came into force 7• 
10. However, voices are increasingly being rai-
sed to say that it is impossible to achieve such 
complicated institutional reforms under pressure 
of an artificial deadline and that it is unproductive 
to allow oneself to be hypnotised by the arbitrary 
determination of that deadline. It will come as no 
surprise therefore that in his report submitted on 
30th March 1995 on behalf of the consultative 
committee responsible for European questions in 
the House of Representatives of Belgium, Mr. 
Eyskens, who is a partisan of " communitarisa-
tion" of Europe's defence dimension, doubts 
whether WEU can be integrated into the European 
Union so early as 1998. 
11. Several authors of a study by the European 
Strategy Group of the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies, published in March 1995 under the title 
" Towards a common defence policy " go further, 
envisaging the possible intermeshing of WEU in 
the European Union ten years hence, a suggested 
date being 2005. Such a time-lag might indeed 
facilitate agreement on the political objectives of 
building Europe and preparation of equitable and 
realistic solutions to the institutional problems 
linked to the implementation of these objectives. 
6. Towards a common defence policy, page 57. 
7. See the texts of Article xn of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and Article 13 of the Washington Treaty appended to 
this report. 
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To the extent that there is agreement on the politi-
cal objectives, it would be possible to adopt a 
step-by-step approach, starting from certain crite-
ria to be met, as in the case for monetary union. In 
this connection, the drafting of a white paper on 
European security might make a useful contribu-
tion. 
12. The intergovernmental conference must 
deal besides with many other areas in addition to 
the revision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, 
namely: 
- the question of bringing into the commu-
nity a third pillar of the Union (internal 
affairs and justice); 
- possibility of enlarging the field of appli-
cation of the European Parliament's pro-
cedure known as eo-decision in the area 
of community legislation; 
- the question of establishing a hierarchy 
of community laws; 
- the possibility of extending the responsi-
bilities of the European Union to energy, 
civil defence, tourism, and 
- further to the European Council's deci-
sion at Corfu, review of the institutional 
operation of the Union with a view to its 
enlargement, 
placing difficult and complicated tasks on coun-
tries participating in this conference, the most dif-
ficult one with potentially the most serious conse-
quences being the revision of Title V of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
13. The preparation of the conference on the 
revision of the provisions of the CFSP, which 
includes the future role of WEU, involves, on the 
European Union side, participation by all its fif-
teen member countries, five of which: Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are not 
members of WEU. On the other hand, it appears 
that the WEU Council, for its part, envisages pre-
paring all the questions relating to the future of 
the modified Brussels Treaty within the restricted 
framework of the countries that are party to it, 
which might give rise to dissatisfaction, not only 
on the part of the five countries referred to above, 
but also of associate member and associate part-
ner countries. 
14. Moreover, it must be recalled that the 
review of the provisions of the declaration of the 
WEU member countries annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty will extend to relations between 
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, which are of par-
ticular interest to associate members, such as Ice-
land, Norway and Turkey. In any event, the Coun-
cil should insist on the principle that any debate 
on the future application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty be confmed exclusively to the signatories 
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of that treaty. The consequence of this will be that 
the group of experts called upon to discuss the 
matter within the framework of the European 
Union, in its composition as decided in Corfu, can 
have no powers of decision in the case of the 
modified Brussels Treaty 8• 
15. Regarding the substance of the problems to 
be resolved, the aims to be pursued in the frame-
work of a revision of the present provisions must 
frrst be determined. One of the deficiencies of the 
Maastricht Treaty lies in the fact that its signato-
ries agreed in principle to create full monetary 
union within a specific time-frame without, at the 
same time, reaching a countervailing agreement 
on a true common policy on foreign affairs, secu-
rity and defence. Many political leaders and 
experts, notably in Germany, but also in other 
European countries, are convinced that European 
monetary union will not be viable without a true 
common European policy in the other areas men-
tioned. 
16. Furthermore, the need to implement a com-
mon security and defence policy cannot be based 
on this argument alone. What matters is fmding a 
consensus on the purpose of building the Euro-
pean Union as a whole, otherwise the discussion 
on institutional questions becomes divorced from 
reality. If we wish to define the aims that WEU 
and its Assembly should pursue in this context 
several of them will have to be reconciled. Unde-
niably the strengthening of the security of mem-
ber states and of their citizens and the protection 
of their fundamental rights as recognised by the 
modified Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the 
United Nations must remain a prime objective of 
the Council and Assembly of WEU. 
17. In receiving associate members, associate 
partners and observer countries into the organisa-
tion, WEU has, in addition, undertaken to extend 
security to the whole of Europe. Strengthening 
security is therefore central to the fundamental 
work done by WEU, an example of which is the 
preparation of a white paper on security, and also 
to its efforts to become truly operational. How-
ever this aim must also be the recurrent theme of 
its strategy when it comes to settling the institu-
tional questions on the agenda of the 1996 inter-
governmental conference. 
18. Secondly, strengthening the principle of 
democracy in a Europe which is organising its 
security and defence can be defmed as another 
prime objective of the same value as that referred 
to in the foregoing paragraphs. Conversely, when 
the European Union sets itself the goal in Article 
B of the Maastricht Treaty of asserting its identity 
8. Similarly Nicole Gnesotto observes (in Politique etrange-
re No.l/95, page 138) that" it is clearly unacceptable for a 
non-member country of a military organisation to be able, by 
indirect means, to determine the fate of that organisation ". 
on the international scene, one might wonder 
whether such an end is defmed clearly enough to 
be the sole justification for the need to create a 
common foreign and security policy eventually 
including a common defence policy and, in time, 
a common defence. 
19. For much remains to be done to reach 
agreement on the purpose the European Union 
should have in the world. Should it become a 
new world power, alongside the United States 
and Russia? What is the final aim of greater 
European integration? Or is integration an end in 
itself? Clearly all member countries cannot be 
expected to provide the same answer to these 
questions. 
20. If integration is regarded not as an end in 
itself but rather as a means of strengthening secu-
rity and democracy in Europe, one may then won-
der what solutions are best adapted to these two 
aims. The question is also raised regarding the 
most suitable institutional instrument for streng-
thening the effectiveness and transparency of the 
European institutions in accordance with the 
wishes of the vast majority of those concerned. 
21. More specifically, in relation to the future 
organisation of the external security and defence 
of the Union, many feel that the existing system is 
too complicated, that it involves too many institu-
tions and that, consequently, it is necessary to 
rationalise and regroup powers within a single 
organisation. The problem in carrying out such an 
undertaking is to ensure that it does not weaken 
security in view of the increasing number of 
applicant countries wishing to participate in a new 
European security architecture but whose respec-
tive political positions and military situations are 
not homogenous. 
22. Another aim often put forward is that of 
remedying the alleged democratic deficit in rela-
tion to control over decision-making processes 
within the framework of the European Union, but 
also in WEU, the Assembly of which has only a 
consultative function and is composed of delega-
tions from national parliaments, while the Euro-
pean Parliament, composed of parliamentarians 
elected by direct universal suffrage, hopes to 
exercise rights of eo-decision in security and 
defence matters or even to replace the WEU 
Assembly entirely for these questions. 
23. Finally, there are two difficult problems to 
resolve if one wishes to improve the structures 
ensuring European security: one is that of future 
transatlantic relations and the role of the United 
States in Europe, and the other, closely linked 
to the first, is the question of enlargement to the 
east, including the place Russia might occupy 
in that system to satisfy its legitimate security 
interests. 
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Ill. Different concepts for linking the defence 
dimension with the European Union 
(a) The community concept 
24. The concept of bringing European foreign 
policy, security and defence (and also internal 
affairs and justice) into the community corres-
ponds to the idea of building Europe, which 
would no longer be based on different pillars 
(community and intergovernmental), but accor-
ding to which the European Commission would 
evolve towards a truly European government, 
possessing all the powers that are characteristic of 
national governments. 
25. In this version of Europe, the rOle of the 
governments brought together in the Council 
would be reduced to that of a second chamber 
along the lines of the German Bundesrat, while 
parliamentary supervision would be entrusted to 
the European Parliament alone, elected by direct 
universal suffrage, the role of the national parlia-
ments alongside the European institutions not 
being clearly defmed. The concept of straightfor-
ward incorporation in the community is upheld 
primarily by the European Parliament and also 
enjoys widespread support in German political 
circles, as testified in a paper on thoughts about 
European policy, published by the CDU/CSU par-
liamentary group of the German Bundestag in 
September 1994. 
26. This document does not however set out 
very clearly the need to bring the CFSP and the 
defence dimension into the Community. It states 
that now is in fact the time to introduce a common 
defence and it therefore advocates that the 1996 
conference " reorganise " relations between WEU 
and the European Union, but without stating how. 
The communitarisation of the CFSP has moreover 
supporters amongst the governments of the 
Netherlands and Belgium, which are nevertheless 
cautious about the real possibility of its being 
implemented during the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference. In a report submitted on 30th March 
1995 on behalf of the consultative committee res-
ponsible for European questions of the House of 
Representatives of Belgium, Mr. Eyskens consi-
ders it desirable in principle for WEU to be inte-
grated into the European Union. However, he 
doubts that this transformation will come into 
effect in 1998. 
27. Other more concrete proposals have been 
made in this connection. Mr. Jean-Marie Guehen-
no, representative of France to WEU, observes in 
a recent article on European security: The impos-
sible status quo 9, "Some even imagine that the 
Secretary-General of WEU is also the European 
Commissioner responsible for the CFSP "; as had 
9. Politique etrangere, January 1995, page 29. 
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already been suggested by Mr. Bourlanges, rap-
porteur of the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
of the European Parliament 10, to the effect that 
WEU's "Secretary-General should be the Com-
mission Vice-President responsible for internatio-
nal action ... " 
28. Such an approach does not of course pre-
judge the Council's ultimate powers of decision-
making in an intergovernmental context and 
consequently safeguards the principle of member 
states having responsibility for decisions to be 
taken in security and defence matters. Neverthe-
less, this approach, in granting the Commission 
not only the right to initiate but also executive res-
ponsibility in this area, regarded by many member 
states as going to the heart of national sovereign-
ty, tends towards attainment of a political aim, 
nam~ly ~o~unitarisation . of defence by an ad 
hoc mstJ.tuttonal measure; It in no way resolves 
the fundamental divergences on whether defence 
~urope should be organised in a community or 
mtergovernmental fashion. 
29. Hence the implementation of such a propo-
sal, far from strengthening effectiveness, would 
cause greater confusion regarding the areas of res-
ponsibility of the various institutions of the 
Union. Causes of this confusion are moreover to 
be found in the wording of Title V of the Maas-
~cht '!'reaty which shows clearly that it was 
Impossible to overcome fundamental disagree-
ments. To increase the confusion over the respec-
~ive areas of responsibility of the Community and 
mtergovernmental institutions might paralyse the 
decision-making process. This also holds good for 
the proposal made by the Netherlands Govern-
mefl:t ~m ~Oth March 1995 concerning increased 
participatiOn by the Commission in the work of a 
strengthened CFSP unit in the framework of the 
Secretariat of the Council or of a new CFSP body. 
30. So far, no member government of the Euro-
pean Union or ofWEU has proposed a sophistica-
t~d c~ncept for bringing Europe's defence dimen-
sion mto the Community, but it is clear that 
certain states categorically reject this idea. The 
report published on 6th April 1995 by the Council 
of the European Union on the functioning of the 
Treaty on European Union therefore limits itself 
tc;> advocating: "As regards preparation for deci-
sion-making [in the CFSP area], it is necessary for 
the bodies and structures of the old EPC [Euro-
pean p~litical co-operation] to be properly inte-
grated mto the single institutional framework 
provided for by the TEU [Treaty on European 
Union]". The European Commission itself on 
1.0th May 1995 published a report on the opera-
tiOn of the Treaty on European Union, the aim of 
10. See the draft report of the Committee on Institutional 
Affairs of the European Parliament on the operation of the 
Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 intergo-
vernmental conference- implementation, lOth April1995. 
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which was to make an assessment rather than put 
forward proposals. Regarding the operation of the 
CFSP, this report concludes that: 
" The very fact that two different working 
met~ods - the Community approach and 
!he mtergovernmental approach - coexist 
m the same treaty is a source of incoheren-
c~. Experience has confirmed the fears pre-
v!ously_ e~pr~ssed on this subject. The 
smgle mstituttonal framework which was 
supposed to ensure harmony between the 
various ' pillars 'of the treaty has not func-
tioned satisfactorily. The proper lessons 
have to be drawn. " 
The European Commission considers that: " The 
U~on must develop a genuine common foreign 
policy commensurate with its economic influence 
and equipped with effective decision-making 
machinery; ". The European Commission there-
fore gives a highly critical assessment of the divi-
sion of the Union's areas of action into different 
"pillars". It also considers that the link with 
WEU has not worked satisfactorily. 
31. The study undertaken by the European 
Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for Secur-
ity Studies entitled " Towards a common defence 
policy " analyses the possibility of merging the 
Treaty on European Union and the WEU Treaty. 
The authors feel that " the strictest institutional 
coherence would require that all policies (the 
CFSP, the CDP and the CD included) should be 
com"!,uni.tarise4 ". But they rightly acknowledge 
that this option, however, seems difficult to 
achieve, both because not all the EU members are 
prepared to accept the commitments deriving 
from Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and because it would require a major transfer of 
national sovereignty to the EU to guarantee the 
effectiveness of a CD. " 
32. ~v~n Mr. van d~n Broe~, the European 
Comm1sstoner for f~reign affarrs and security, 
stated.before a committee of the European Parlia-
ment m early January 1995 that the introduction 
of t~e. defence component might be facilitated by 
retammg WEU as a separate structure 11 • More-
over •. it appears tha~ a ~tudy prepared at the request 
of this same comm1ssioner by the high level group 
of experts on the CFSP concluded in December 
J 994 that foreign policy, security and defence 
I~sues were speci~ cases, to which it was impos-
sible to apply the community " formulas which 
had proved their worth in the economic sphere, 
but were not to be imitated in the area which 
concerns us here. 
33. Your Rapporteur, who does not endorse 
extending the community process to European 
defence, feels it necessary nevertheless to add the 
11. Europe, No. 6392, 6th January 1995. 
following considerations: in order to understand 
why German policy is particularly favourable to 
the " community " concept of European defence, 
it must not be overlooked that herein lies the 
expression of the firm intention of a united and 
consequently much more influential Germany, 
vis-a-vis its European partners, to be integrated 
wholeheartedly into Europe so as to avoid its 
increased influence leading to a renationalisation 
of defence policy and/or a possible return to a 
policy of ad hoc alliances in Europe the conse-
quences of which that continent suffered up to the 
end of the second world war. Paradoxically, Ger-
many's determination to be integrated into Europe 
and even to be subject to decisions taken by qua-
lified majority in cases where Germany was in a 
minority is often used by opponents of the com-
munity system as an argument against the Ger-
mans, to the effect that such a system would auto-
matically lead to Germany dominating Europe. 
Advocates of a community system on the other 
hand at times criticise the intergovernmental sys-
tem, arguing that the latter would also facilitate 
German domination in another manner ... 
34. It is to be hoped that the British Foreign 
Secretary, Mr. Hurd, was right when he stated in a 
speech in Berlin on 28th February 1995 that one 
should not fear being driven to a choice between 
two extremes: far-reaching integration on the one 
hand and competition between nation states on the 
nineteenth century model on the other. In his 
view, a balance must be found between the system 
introduced with the single market and community 
institutions on the one hand and the survival of the 
nation states on the other. This approach seems 
more reasonable than the endeavours of another 
British minister who attempted, in an article in the 
German press, to convince public opinion in that 
country that nationalism as such was not such a 
bad thing 12• Almost simultaneously, Mr. Mitter-
rand, the outgoing President of the French Repu-
blic, stated in his last speech to the European Par-
liament that nationalism was war 13• 
35. In any event, it now seems that it will prove 
impossible at the 1996 conference to overcome 
the differences between those in favour of making 
all the Union's areas of activity a Community 
matter and those who prefer the intergovernmen-
tal system in certain matters and particularly 
defence. However, according to Mr. Guehenno 
" the present ambiguity, which holds out the pos-
sibility of future European integration, without 
truly implementing it, cannot be maintained for 
any length of time " 14• However this does not 
mean that the intergovernmental conference is 
12. David Davis, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17th 
January 1995. 
13. Le Figaro, 18th January 1995; Le Monde, 19th January 
1995. 
14. Politique etrangere, January 1995, page 27. 
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condemned to failure. It is possible to make consi-
derable progress while retaining an intergovern-
mental approach. 
36. For, as matters now stand, it is essential to 
bring the views of states together, not to deprive 
them of their ability to assess the situation and 
decide on action. It is a matter of facilitating their 
decision by assuring them that they will have the 
necessary means to act. To subordinate all action 
to bodies which accept only collective action 
would leave Europe completely powerless. 
(b) Intergovernmental concepts 
37. A gradation of such concepts is to be noted. 
First, let us consider those closest to the Commu-
nity system and subsequently those which opt 
more in favour of maintaining the autonomy of 
existing institutions, practically without change. 
(i) Merger ofWEU and the CFSP (second pillar 
of the European Union) 
38. On 8th March 1995, the German Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, stated he 
was in favour of a merger between the European 
Union and WEU. He advocates that Germany and 
France co-operate closely in this connection and 
convince their partners of the necessity of this 
measure which would constitute further progress 
towards European integration 1S. Although the 
German minister does not enter into the detail of 
the practical arrangements for this merger, his 
proposal makes clear that it falls within the frame-
work of the development of the CFSP and there-
fore within the existing intergovernmental 
domain. However, it does not rule out the fact that 
decisions might be taken by qualified majority, 
which has not hitherto been the case in defence 
matters. 
39. In emphasising that the development of the 
Eurocorps, the fledgling European army, was a 
model for co-operation in defence matters, of 
great interest to many European Union member 
states, the German minister opened the door to 
multifarious conjecture as to the authority under 
which this body should be placed after any merger 
between the European Union and WEU. This sta-
tement might therefore be interpreted as a propo-
sal for incorporating WEU into the second pillar 
of the European Union, namely the CFSP, as it 
introduces the possibility of decision-making in 
defence matters by qualified majority. 
40. In an interview with Le Figaro on 16th 
March 1995, and at the end of March, in the 
framework of the Konigswinter conference, the 
traditional meeting-place of British and German 
officials, Mr. Kinkel repeated his proposal for 
15. Die Zeit, lOth March 1995. 
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merging WEU and the European Union 16• He 
stressed that the European Union should develop 
its ability to act in this area of the CFSP and rapid-
ly adopt clear positions. " This is why majority 
decisions in foreign policy should no longer be 
taboo ". He added that " those demanding this 
new procedure should, in all honesty, state that 
they will accept majority decisions even when 
they are contrary to their own preference!" 
Mr. Kinkel also replied affirmatively when asked 
whether it was necessary to create a European 
foreign affairs ministry. 
41. In this context, it should be recalled that the 
report of the Council of the European Union on 
the operation of the Treaty on European Union 
states that, since the entry into force of this treaty, 
unanimity is the rule and that qualified majority 
voting, the use of which is made possible by 
Article J .3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union, has not been used. 
42. According to information appearing in 
the American and French press 17, the German 
Government is currently preparing to take a posi-
tion along the lines referred to in paragraph 40; it 
will reach its decision towards mid-June 1995. 
According to the press articles mentioned, the 
German Government would appear to be conside-
ring providing the Secretary-General of the Coun-
cil of the European Union with a" working unit " 
similar to a forecasting and analysis centre. The 
Secretariat-General would act as a transmission 
link between the European Council and the Com-
mission in Brussels and might eventually in the 
longer term be brought together with the WEU 
Secretariat-General, having itself been merged 
with the European Union. 
43. According to a report by the Netherlands 
Government on the CFSP of the European Union, 
transmitted on 30th March 1995 to the Nether-
lands Parliament, Germany's idea of introducing, 
when possible, majority decision-making for 
adopting a common action deserves serious consi-
deration. The Netherlands Government states in 
this respect that this would be " majority decision-
making within an intergovernmental context. This 
must be distinguished from majority decision-
making within the Community framework, which 
is a process based on the Commission's exclusive 
right of initiative ... " It feels however that" com-
munitarisation of the CFSP along these lines may 
be an option for the longer term. " 
44. On the basis of these considerations, the 
Netherlands Government is examining the diffe-
rent approaches to absorption of WEU in the 
European Union, for which it expresses its prefe-
rence in principle. While giving greater weight to 
16. See AFP, 30th March 1995. 
17. Wall Street Journal Europe, 9th May 1995 and Le 
Monde, 18th May 1995. 
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the Community approach, the Netherlands 
Government is endeavouring to draw closer to 
Germany on this point. It thinks however that in 
view of the tension resulting from differences 
between the Community and intergovernmental 
points of view, it will be necessary to seek solu-
tions where elements of a Community approach 
are combined with the needs of member states 
that wish to retain an intergovernmental concept 
of the CFSP. All these considerations are leading 
the Netherlands Government to opt for WEU's 
integration into the second pillar of the Union (the 
CFSP) which has " the advantage of smoothing 
the transition from CFSP to a common defence 
policy ... " 
45. The Netherlands Government nevertheless 
feels that " given the complexity of the problems 
mentioned above, it does not seem possible to 
achieve full integration of WEU in the EU in the 
short term. While the former will therefore conti-
nue to exist as a separate organisation for some 
time to come, the IGC ought nevertheless to take 
the first steps towards full integration. " Your 
Rapporteur has developed in paragraphs 28 and 
29 above the reasons why she believes that the 
attempt to mix Community and intergovernmen-
tal responsibilities in this way over a transitional 
period can only lead to increased confusion and 
growing difficulties in the decision-making pro-
cess and can in no way improve its effectiveness 
and transparency. 
46. The same holds true for the proposal made 
by the Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Dehaene, 
in an address given to the College d 'Europe in 
Bruges 18 • He suggested WEU being associated 
with the European Union through the establish-
ment of a common budget, the merging of the 
Secretariat with the CFSP and the presidencies 
being held by one and the same country. 
47. The creation, on NATO lines, of a high-
level secretariat for the CFSP, which would also 
be responsible for WEU affairs, was proposed as 
far back as October 1994 by the Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Martino. The 
appointment of a Secretary-General for the CFSP 
has also been suggested by Mr. Lamassoure, 
French Minister for European Affairs and by 
Mr. Aznar, Chairman of the Spanish People's 
Party. However the latter two do not specify 
whether the Secretary-General in question should 
have responsibilities for WEU. Nor do the three 
proposals settle to what extent this secretary-
general should or should not have duties separate 
from those of the Secretary-General of the Coun-
cil of the European Union, already in office. 
48. Certain considerations put forward by the 
European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies on bringing WEU in as a true 
18. La Libre Belgique, 24th March 1995. 
component of the European Union 19 also fall 
within the scope of the merging of WEU with the 
CFSP. According to this thinking: 
" The modified Brussels Treaty (WEU) 
could be formally included in an amended 
Maastricht Treaty, establishing EU reco-
gnition of its application to all members of 
WEU. Those members of the EU that are 
not members of WEU would therefore 
recognise the WEU role in the CFSP and 
CDP, and commit themselves to avoiding 
any action that might impede or run counter 
to it. Such a decision by itself would not 
modify considerably what is already estab-
lished by the Maastricht Treaty, except for 
one significant point: it would make WEU 
a formal part of the EU. Thus, the present 
mechanism, according to which the EU 
Council of Ministers can only request 
WEU to act, would become obsolete and 
the EU Council of Ministers would simply 
tell WEU to act. 
However, such a change would only be 
acceptable if the EU simultaneously adop-
ted other measures making variable unity a 
working reality and guaranteeing the effec-
tiveness of the CDP/CD decision-making 
process. 
The decision to include the text of the 
modified Brussels Treaty in the Maastricht 
Treaty is different from the decision to fuse 
the two treaties. However, it would proba-
bly initiate a gradual process of communi-
tarisation of the CDP/CD and WEU that 
could lead to some important modification 
of the modified Brussels Treaty itself. A 
significant change would be that the Com-
mission of the EU could also itself propose 
to the WEU Council that a joint action be 
initiated. If the communitarisation of WEU 
and of the CDP developed further, it could 
mean that if a joint action were proposed by 
the Commission, the WEU Council would 
decide by majority vote. 
Also, the problem of revising the roles and 
powers of the Secretary-General of WEU 
could arise. Such a revision could be requi-
red if the Secretary-General of the CFSP 
were also the Secretary-General of WEU. 
In particular, it should be made clear 
whether this new " double-hatted " Secre-
tary-General would hold powers of initiati-
ve or not and his relationship with the Com-
mission, the EU Council and the European 
Parliament would need to be defmed. " 
49. The high-level group of experts on the 
CFSP set up by Mr. van den Broek, European 
19. Towards a common defence policy, March 1995. 
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Commissioner responsible for European common 
security policy, proposed at the end of December 
1994 creating "permanent central analysis and 
evaluation capability in Brussels, . . . endowed 
with the necessary study and information capacity 
. . . directed by a political personality designated 
along the same lines as that for the President of 
the Commission (European Council and Euro-
pean Parliament) and thus benefitting from suffi-
cient authority, independence and duration in 
office. " The group proposes, inter alia, that such a 
person should bring together, within a common fra-
mework, the tripartite expertise of the Council of 
the Union, the European Commission and ofWEU. 
50. A like idea was taken up in an address by 
Mr. Jacques Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, on 3rd 
April1995, to the Royal Institute of International 
Relations in Brussels in which he stressed that the 
Commission should be associated with this unit of 
analysis and take on a more active role, if only 
because of the global nature that security policy is 
likely to have in future. The Netherlands Govern-
ment is calling for a strengthening of the CFSP 
unit by proposing that the body within which the 
CFSP is prepared should be detached from the 
Council Secretariat which has responsibility for 
preparing all Councils of Ministers. Such a body, 
possibly under the authority of a Secretary-Gene-
ral, might be exclusively dedicated to the CFSP. 
According to the Netherlands Government, the 
Commission should participate in the work of 
such a strengthened CFSP unit. 
51. Conversely, a report submitted by Mr. Eys-
kens on 30th March 1995, on behalf of the consul-
tative committee responsible for European ques-
tions of the House of Representatives of Belgium, 
takes the view that " one must avoid stronger ins-
titutionalisation of the CFSP leading to the crea-
tion of a sort of ' high authority ' responsible for 
the CFSP, in parallel with the Commission and to 
the latter's detriment". 
52. Summarising all the known initiatives so 
far for merging WEU with the CFSP, it has to be 
admitted that none of them offers viable solutions 
for overcoming the various dilemmas facing the 
intergovernmental conference: 
- no state will accept that its soldiers 
should sacrifice their lives on the basis of 
a qualified majority vote 20; 
- the problem arising from the fact that 
five states ofthe European Union are not 
prepared to become full members of 
WEU has not been resolved; 
- the question of the participation of asso-
ciate member countries such as Iceland, 
20. Nicole Gnesotto in Politique etrangere, January 1995. 
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Norway and Turkey in WEU once the 
latter has merged with the CFSP, has not 
been decided; 
- the difficulty of achieving coincidence 
between the WEU and European Union 
presidencies still remains; 
- the confusion between the respective 
areas of responsibility of the Community 
and intergovernmental institutions 
would increase, at the expense of the 
effectiveness and transparency of the 
decision-making process; 
- the different aspects of merging the trea-
ties or of incorporating the modified 
Brussels Treaty in a new treaty of the 
Union have not been developed; 
- the question of democratic control over 
WEU when merged with the CFSP will 
necessarily aggravate the problem of the 
respective areas of responsibility of the 
WEU Assembly and of the European 
Parliament. 
53. Under such conditions, it is difficult to ima-
gine that a merger of WEU and the CFSP based 
on the introduction of a qualified majority vote for 
defence matters, in connection with the second 
pillar of the European Union might lead to a 
strengthening of security, democracy, effective-
ness and transparency within the Union. 
(ii) The creation of a fourth pillar of the Euro-
pean Union 
54. Conversely, study of the merger between 
WEU and the European Union within the frame-
work of intergovernmental structures might lead to 
the idea of creating a fourth pillar of the European 
Union: to the second pillar- common foreign and 
security policy, and third pillar - internal affairs 
and justice, would be added a " defence pillar ". In 
this connection, the United Kingdom press initial-
ly gave to understand (in autumn 1994 21) that the 
government of that country would be prepared to 
accept a fourth pillar, but the United Kingdom 
Prime Minister announced at the beginning of 
March 1995 that his government rejected this 
model in favour of pursuing the development 
of WEU in a structure separate from that of the 
European Union 22• For different reasons, the 
Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the 
creation of a fourth pillar within the Treaty of 
European Union seems to have few advantages 23• 
21. The Guardian, 27th October 1994. 
22. Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's 
approach to the treatment of European defence issues at the 
1996 intergovernmental conference, 1st March 1995. 
23. See report on the CFSP, transmitted by the Netherlands 
Parliament on 30th March 1995. 
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55. Notwithstanding the United Kingdom and 
Netherlands positions, it might be assumed that 
WEU's incorporation into a new pillar of the 
European Union will be an issue in one way or 
another in the 1996 negotiations. It is necessary 
therefore to examine the problems and implica-
tions of such a model. According to the study of 
the European Strategy Group of the WEU Insti-
tute for Security Studies referred to previously, 
the 1996 conference " could follow the Maastricht 
path, choosing to strengthen a single Union with 
multiple pillars, and making WEU a formal pillar 
of the EU like the monetary union and maintai-
ning distinct decision-making rules inside it. This 
approach might gain the support of several mem-
ber countries but would require a significant 
rewriting of both treaties. " According to this 
study, " it is unlikely, and it would be imprudent 
for the next IGC to make such an effort without a 
careful appraisal of further experience and of 
various possible decision-making procedures. " If 
WEU were to become one of the pillars of the 
European Union, the first question to be raised 
would be the fate of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
One might envisage, as the European Parliament 
has proposed, incorporating the " fundamental 
elements " of the modified Brussels Treaty into 
the new Treaty on European Union 24• 
56. But what are the fundamental elements of 
the modified Brussels Treaty that should be pre-
served? The only thing which is clear in this res-
pect is that the European Parliament wishes to see 
a change to Article IX so that the powers granted 
under this provision to the WEU Assembly are 
transferred to it. Several other questions are also 
raised: account must be taken of the fact that five 
members of the European Union are not ready to 
commit themselves fully to co-operation in WEU. 
While the European Parliament considers that a 
different (unspecified) solution must be found for 
member countries of the Union which are not full 
members of WEU, certain groups of experts of the 
European Commission feel it necessary to foresee 
a new institutional mechanism according to which 
WEU would retain only its collective defence 
function under the terms of Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty. Such a concept is, however, 
contrary to the recently publicised United King-
dom position, according to which the collective 
defence of Europe should remain the principal 
task of NATO, while WEU should concentrate on 
the" Petersberg "missions, namely humanitarian, 
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions 25 • 
57. Although technically it is not difficult to 
incorporate all or part of the modified Brussels 
24. See the Poettering report, European Parliament docu-
ment A3-0109/94, adopted 24th March 1994. 
25. Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government 
approach to the treatment of European defence issues at the 
1996 intergovernmental conference, 1st March 1995. 
Treaty in a new title of the Treaty on European 
Union (in the same way as all the treaties setting 
up the European Community, the Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Agency have been incorporated in it), the ~ore­
mentioned example shows that a complex discus-
sion of the use or need of each of these provisions 
is likely. 
58. In order to avoid this type of discussion, 
whose result cannot be foreseen, at the 1996 
conference, one might be tempted simply to 
follow the United Kingdom suggestion 26 of 
1st March 1995, which would allow WEU to 
pursue its development independently of the 
structures of the European Union, but in close co-
operation with them. However, this solution 
would not exempt WEU from the obligation of 
re-examining the provisions of its own treaty and 
of the Maastricht Treaty, a review which should 
extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance. WEU is, in point of fact, the only Euro-
pean institution with a contractual link with the 
Atlantic Alliance from which the whole of the 
European Union might benefit, ~he .more .so, .the 
closer WEU draws to that organisatlOn at mstitu-
tionallevel. 
59. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the pres-
sure that will be exerted by certain countries and 
interested institutions of the European Union to 
bring about the " absorption " of WEU by the 
Union will continue to be very strong on account 
of a perspective that is very wide~pr~ad, particu-
larly in Germany, that any stagnat10n m European 
integration has to be regarded as a reversal of that 
process. 
60. If we wish to advance- in the root meaning 
of the word - European Union, an initial pitfall 
must be avoided: the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference must not degenerate into a competi-
tion between interested institutions where each is 
endeavouring to ensure its survival or increase its 
powers and areas of responsibility according to 
Montesquieu's sociological law. Hence, "large 
organisations ", which are powerful and structured, 
tend to seek to stifle any activity by another orga-
nisation automatically perceived as a " compe-
titor " even when it is of negligible weight and its 
field of action is different 27• It is therefore neces-
sary first to agree the main aims of a revision of 
the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty .rel~ting to 
security and defence matters and the cntena to be 
followed to achieve such aims. 
61. Any review tending towards WEU's pos-
sible transformation into one of the pillars of the 
26. Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government 
approach to the treatment of European defence issues at the 
1996 intergovernmental conference, 1st March 1995. 
27. DeDefensa, 10thApri11995, Volume 10,No.l4,page 14. 
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European Union must be motivated by the primary 
intention of guaranteeing and strengthening the 
security of European citizens and not of reducing 
or weakening it. There can therefore be no ques-
tion of in any way lessening the scope of Article y 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. Above all, It 
would be unacceptable to use possible weakening 
of the scope of this article to facilitate the entry 
into WEU of five countries, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland and Sweden, or to make it easier 
to enlarge WEU to include the countries of Cen-
tral Europe. It would be equally dangerous to opt 
to follow a policy the aim of which was to make 
NATO the only organisation responsible for the 
defence of Europe on the sole basis of Article 5 of 
the Treaty of Washington, which imposes le~s 
stringent obligations than Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, while WEU's main task 
became no more than implementing Petersberg-
type missions. Now if NATO military structures 
are the only guarantee of the allies' collective 
commitment, any withdrawal of American forces, 
if confirmed, would put an end to that structure. If 
the intergovernmental conference were to decide 
to include the mandate provided for under Article 
V of the modified Brussels Treaty in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, legitimate collective defence wo~ld 
then be the responsibility of the European Umon 
and WEU would become its defence pillar 28• 
According to the Netherlands Government report 
referred to earlier on the foreign, security and 
defence policy of the European Union, m~st 
member states, including the Netherlands, will 
consider that there can be no common defence 
policy without mutual obligations, even ~f that 
does nothing to change the fact that the Imple-
mentation of such a policy continues to be the res-
ponsibility of NATO. 
62. Conversely, there are still many underlying 
uncertainties and misunderstandings about estab-
lishing the conditions necessary for de<:ision-
making on crisis-management, peace-making or 
peace-enforcement outside ~e area of a~plica­
tion of compulsory mutual assistance. Admittedly 
there is no treaty that obliges European nations to 
take joint decisions in the areas just mentioned. 
The Netherlands Government therefore rightly 
emphasises the need for stronger external action 
on the part of the European Union " primarily ... 
because contemporary problems exceed, to an 
increasing extent, the capacity of individual 
countries to make an appropriate response." But 
it is debatable to present matters as if the tasks 
referred to above did not derive explicitly from 
the modified Brussels Treaty. It is therefore 
necessary to reiterate the terms and emphasise 
the scope of Article vm, paragraph 3, of the 
28. See" Towards a common defence policy", a study by 
the European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies, March 1995. 
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modified Brussels Treaty 29, which should be pre-
served in its entirety and applied in the event of 
WEU being incorporated into a fourth pillar of 
the Union. 
63. . The major advantage of this provision lies 
in the fact that the WEU member states and (in the 
event of its incorporation into a new treaty on the 
Union) those of the Union are free to commit 
themselves or not in joint action out-of-area and 
situations covered by mutual assistance obliga-
tions. Consultations on the basis of Article Vlll, 
paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty can 
therefore lead to a decision on joint action without 
obligation to participate therein, but also without 
the possibility of blocking it by a veto. This pro-
cedure enables certain countries to abstain but 
also to delegate to others the power of acting on 
behalf of WEU, as was the case in the Gulf and in 
Bosnia. 
64. Moreover, it is necessary to maintain and 
strengthen suitable means for ensuring transatlan-
tic co-operation within the framework of NATO, 
as expressly provided for in Article N, paragraph 
1, of the modified Brussels Treaty. The contrac-
tual link must not be affected by efforts to extend 
the range of transatlantic co-operation to other 
areas on the basis of future provisions. Closer co-
operation with NATO should become obvious in 
particular when it is a question of harmonising 
points of view on the enlargement of European 
and transatlantic institutions, in particular towards 
the East. This subject will be examined further in 
a subsequent chapter. In any event, Article XI, 
governing the conditions under which other states 
might be invited to accede to the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, must be retained. 
65. Inter alia, the fate ofProtocols II and m and 
Protocol N on the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, based on Article Vlll, paragraph 2, 
of the modified Brussels Treaty must be determi-
ned. In this connection, your Rapporteur supports 
the proposal for the elimination of the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments presented by the 
Assembly in June 1991 in its Recommendation 
504 on the revision of the modified Brussels Trea-
ty on a report by Mr. Goerens 30• 
66. In the event of the main parts of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty being transferred to a new 
revised treaty on European Union, it will be abso-
lutely essential to study the consequences of this 
at institutional level and at the level of the deci-
sion-making process. Similarly, in the event of a 
merger of WEU with the second pillar of the 
29. Article Vlll, paragraph 3 states" At the request of any of 
the high contracting parties, the Council shall be immediately 
convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to 
any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic sta-
bility ... 
30. Document 1261. 
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European Union (the CFSP), the specific problem 
will need to be resolved of the five countries 
which are no more prepared to take on more bin-
ding commitments in defence matters within the 
framework of a revised treaty on European Union 
than they are at present to accede to the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, a solution must 
be found for WEU associate members, namely 
Iceland, Norway and Turkey, which, through the 
" defence " pillar should be enabled to obtain the 
same status as member countries, without neces-
sarily participating in the CFSP pillar in its pre-
sent configuration. 
67. According to the opinion which the Nether-
lands Government submitted to the Netherlands 
Parliament on 30th March 1995, a form of asso-
ciation of these countries with the European 
Union might be envisaged. " This may involve no 
more than a new fourth pillar but, given the fact 
that common defence policy and the CFSP are 
closely interlinked, it may extend to the second 
pillar, especially if the common defence policy 
ultimately takes shape within it. This question is 
especially relevant in view of the special position 
of Turkey, and it therefore merits particular atten-
tion during the preparations for the I GC. " Indeed, 
this question will become crucial if the eventual 
full integration of the " defence dimension " into 
the Union is envisaged. 
Implications for the executive 
68. Among the various models considered, the 
one developed in the study of the European Stra-
tegy Group and the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies, published in March 1995, deserves parti-
cular attention. According to this model: 
"Since all members of the EU are repre-
sented within WEU, a Defence Policy 
Council could meet in the same configura-
tion as the EU Council of Ministers does 
for the CFSP, adding defence ministers; 
only member countries of the modified 
Brussels Treaty would have the right to 
vote, whereas the others would not be obli-
ged to adopt the Council's decisions, yet 
have the possibility of associating them-
selves with the policies decided on. Partici-
pation in meetings of the Council would be 
in accordance with the agenda: discussions 
related to Article V or concerning relations 
with NATO would not be open to WEU 
non-member countries, in line with current 
WEU practice. Similar rules would apply 
in meetings of subsidiary bodies of the 
Defence Policy Council, including those of 
high-ranking officials from capitals dealing 
with the CFSP and defence (the EU's Secu-
rity Group and WEU's Special Working 
Group could then be combined). As there 
are already permanent representatives to 
WEU, a second Committee of Pennanent 
Representatives dealing with defence poli-
cy would have to be set up in the EU; this 
would not necessarily imply the creation of 
two delegations from each EU member 
state, as the second ambassador could be a 
member of the national representation to 
the EU." 
69. The authors of this study rightly wonder: 
" What will happen concerning the associate 
members or associate partners that already parti-
cipate in the working of WEU but will not all 
become full members of the EU in the near 
future? " Without being able to give defmite 
answers - which is not surprising given the com-
plexity of the problems to be handled - the 
authors take the view that: 
" Arrangements will have to be made for 
these countries, which of course cannot be 
deprived of their present rights in WEU. 
The answer will not be easy to the extent 
that the EU, for reasons of homogeneity, 
does not have a comparable associate status. 
It might be useful to devote some thought 
to the introduction of such a status for non-
member countries so that they can partici-
pate in the intergovernmental pillars of the 
EU. Another problem, closely related to the 
fonner, is worth considering if it is decided 
to incorporate WEU into the EU: can the 
EU become a European pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance if its members are not all mem-
bers of the alliance and if some European 
NATO allies are not members of the EU? " 
70. Again, according to the abovementioned 
study: 
" The WEU Secretariat... could become a 
subdivision of the EU Council Secretariat 
as a specialised directorate for defence 
policy. The Planning Cell, which would 
only respond to the Defence Policy 
Council, could be collocated with the EU 
Council Secretariat. " 
71. As paragraphs 46 to 50 above have already 
shown, there are other proposals for creating a 
high-level secretariat for the CFSP, separate from 
that of the Council of the Union, but at the same 
time responsible for WEU affairs. Conversely, 
Mr. Guena, in his report on behalf of the delega-
tion of the French Senate to the European Union 
on the anticipated refonn in 1996 of the European 
Union institutions 31 suggests the creation of a 
secretariat-general for each pillar of the Union, 
whereas the group of experts fonned by Mr. van 
den Broek has proposed the creation of a central 
analysis capability bringing together the tripartite 
31. The 1996 reform of the institutions of the European 
Union, Volume I, No. 224, 1994-95, pages 32 and 37. 
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expertise of the Council of the Union, WEU and 
the Commission. The involvement of the latter in 
defence matters nevertheless raises very wide 
controversy. 
72. The authors of the study by the European 
Strategy Group of the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies already referred to are very aware that 
certain member countries are most reluctant to see 
the responsibilities of the European Commission 
extended to defence policy matters. They recogni-
se therefore that it might prove difficult to reach 
agreement on a mechanism that is differentiated 
from the existing CFSP procedures (where the 
Commission has a non-exclusive right of initia-
tive). In their opinion, " a right to put forward pro-
posals would, as an alternative, be given to the EU 
Council Secretariat, specifically to its specialised 
Defence Directorate. This would not be exclusive, 
as the member states would themselves have the 
right to put forward proposals. " Indeed, the ques-
tion as to whether the European Commission 
should acquire a responsibility in the event of 
WEU being incorporated into a fourth pillar of the 
Union, which would remain purely intergovern-
mental and would take decisions on a unanimous 
basis, will be crucial in assessing the acceptability 
of such a model. 
Parliamentary supervision 
73. Parliamentary supervision is the issue 
which will raise the most acute controversy in the 
event of WEU being incorporated into the Euro-
pean Union, even if it is to be integrated into a 
purely intergovernmental " defence " pillar and 
separate from the CFSP in its present fonn. There 
are many and various proposals for improving 
democratic supervision of defence and security 
policy. 
74. Before examining them, it is necessary to 
stress that the Assembly of WEU considers 
strengthening democratic supervision to be a cru-
cial factor in building the European Union as a 
whole, which, ten years hence, will perhaps inclu-
de some 25 member countries, the population of 
which, in excess of 450 million inhabitants, will 
be far greater than that of the United States, Rus-
sia or the Community of Independent States. The 
problem of effective and representative democra-
tic supervision of such a vast area, with increas-
ingly powerful executive bodies, therefore goes 
beyond the simple choice between a Europe, in 
particular a defence Europe, organised on a 
" community " model or one on intergovernmen-
tal lines. 
75. Apart from this question, the following 
point must be examined: if one truly wishes to 
work for democracy in a unified Europe, must one 
really limit oneself to asking repeatedly for the 
powers and rights of the European Parliament 
alone to be strengthened? Indeed, the majority of 
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the large democracies of Europe and North Ame-
rica, some of which have very old traditions, have 
preferred to ensure democratic supervision of the 
executive through a bicameral parliamentary sys-
tem. Is it even thinkable therefore that the Euro-
pean Parliament should be the only parliamentary 
body of the European Union responsible for 
supervision ofthe European executive? 
76. It must be realised that the direction the 
intergovernmental conference will take when sett-
ling the question of parliamentary supervision of 
the future defence Europe will have decisive 
consequences for the subsequent development of 
the parliamentary dimension of the entire Euro-
pean Union. 
77. The approach chosen up to now by the 
Maastricht Treaty in drafting Article J. 7 of Title V 
was to have the European Parliament intervene 
progressively in the area of common foreign and 
security policy, in other words, not only in a fun-
damentally intergovernmental arrangement, but 
also in an area which includes the eventual defini-
tion of a common defence policy, WEU being res-
ponsible for working out and implementing deci-
sions and actions of the Union which have 
implications in that area. Yet according to Article 
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, it is to the 
WEU Assembly alone that the Council of that 
organisation is obliged to submit a report on its 
activities. Further to Article J.ll, the European 
Parliament has also obtained a right of budgetary 
eo-decision over CFSP matters. Hence Mr. Guena 
rightly observes in a report published on 15th 
February 1995 on behalf of the delegation of the 
French Senate to the European Union 32 notes that 
the association of the European Parliament " with 
a fundamentally intergovernmental policy leads 
to a blurring of responsibility and institutional 
confusion, an ongoing source of procedural diffi-
culty . . . the Maastricht Treaty has initiated a 
mixing of the species which has proved to be a 
source of confusion and has aroused paralysing 
procedural controversies. " 
78. Several proposals seek to overcome present 
ambiguities. The European Parliament initially 
favoured a solution providing for the latter to 
replace the WEU Assembly completely, both at 
the level of plenary sessions and at committee 
level, the powers and voting conditions of the 
European Parliament being defmed by the inter-
governmental conference 33• This concept is sup-
ported, inter alia, by Mr. Eyskens, who wonders in 
the report already referred to whether the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU should not be compo-
sed of members of the European Parliament. 
32. The 1996 reform of the European Union institutions, 
Volume I, Senate Report No. 224. 
33. See the de Gucht report adopted on 24th February 1994. 
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79. None of these considerations provides an 
answer to the question of how members of the 
European Parliament elected by direct universal 
suffrage and remote from national electorates can 
claim to exercise supervision over decisions 
which are taken exclusively in a national and 
intergovernmental framework. The only answer is 
perhaps to be found in the hypothesis voiced by 
advocates of this solution, to the effect that secu-
rity and defence will ultimately be integrated in 
supranational, indeed" communitarised" execu-
tive bodies. 
80. However, other problems are raised in this 
context: the first is linked to the existence of a 
variable geometry Europe and the other to the fact 
that national parliaments are claiming increased 
supervision over the development of decisions at 
European level, even in the purely " community " 
domain. In an attempt to resolve the first problem, 
Mr. Bourlanges, Rapporteur of the Committee 
on Institutional Affairs of the European Parlia-
ment 34 observes that: 
" The foreseeable emergence of restricted 
circles of integration in the areas of mone-
tary union, WEU or the Schengen area 
poses a serious threat to the very existence 
of parliamentary control. Whenever Union 
policies are pursued within a specific insti-
tutional framework and for a period of 
several years by a restricted number of 
member states, it is therefore vital to set up 
an ad hoc body to exercise parliamentary 
control. Such ad hoc bodies which would 
have to be restricted in size and composed 
exclusively of members of the European 
Parliament from the member states concer-
ned, could be administered by the secreta-
riat of the European Parliament, which 
would thus play a pivotal role in a genuine 
European system of parliamentary control 
(ESPC)" 
81. It must first be noted that this proposal in 
no way resolves the problems due to the existence 
of associate member and associate partner coun-
tries which have parliamentary representation in 
the WEU Assembly, but not in the European Par-
liament since they are not part of it. Second, it 
does not provide for any participation by national 
parliaments in the " ad hoc assemblies ". 
82. In a report submitted in the context of the 
French National Assembly, two deputies, MM. 
Catala and Ameline 35 envisage the creation of an 
34. See the draft report of the Committee on Institutional 
Affairs of the European Parliament on the operation of the 
Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 intergo-
vernmental conference- implementation, lOth April1995. 
35. What reforms for tomorrow's Europe?, French National 
Assembly, delegation to the European Union, Information 
Report No. 1389, 8th February 1995. 
interparliamentary committee with the participa-
tion of the national parliaments in the decision-
making process of the Union and composed of 
an equal and small number of representatives 
per member state. " This committee would also 
constitute the appropriate parliamentary supervi-
sory authority for the restricted circles set up in 
currency and defence matters ". In these areas the 
function of such committee would be consulta-
tive, whereas it would have a decision-making 
power as regards treaty revision, the application 
of Article 235 of the treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community 36, international agreements and 
the enlargement of the Union, the budget, income 
and internal and judicial matters. 
83. This idea is undoubtedly interesting, but it 
should be recalled in this connection that in the 
matters in which this committee would have 
consultative responsibilities, the WEU Assembly 
with its present structures could be used perfectly 
well, whereas the second area of responsibilities 
envisaged for this committee would raise - as the 
authors themselves recognise - awkward pro-
blems in connection with determining the condi-
tions under which the national parliaments make 
their views known in this committee and the need 
to avoid the European Parliament and the com-
mittee mutually paralysing each other. 
84. If it is wished to maintain democratic and 
representative supervision in the framework of a 
European Union which is to be enlarged conside-
rably in a foreseeable future, it is necessary to 
create a bicameral system which facilitates such 
supervision and does not lead to a stalemate. It is 
therefore necessary to establish clearly the res-
ponsibilities of the parliamentary institutions in 
question. Conversely, one must reject any propo-
sal tending to create mixed parliamentary institu-
tions such as the one which envisages representa-
tives of national parliaments sitting in the 
European Parliament alongside members elected 
by direct universal suffrage. 
85. This solution would not only have the 
disadvantage of creating a two-speed Assembly, 
but, far from improving efficiency, would contri-
bute also to a blurring of responsibilities. The 
same holds true for the proposal developed in 
Chapter V of the study by the European Strategy 
Group and the WEU Institute for Security Studies 
which envisages replacing the WEU Assembly by 
a newly-created joint parliamentary committee on 
European defence, composed of representatives 
of the European Parliament and members of the 
36. Article 235 reads as follows: " If action by the Commu-
nity should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community and this treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Par-
liament, take the appropriate measures. " 
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security and defence committees of the various 
national parliaments. Conversely, this study right-
ly points out that the present composition of the 
WEU Assembly, being dependent on that of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Euro-
pe, does not have any obvious link with the com-
mittees of the national parliaments dealing with 
defence and security policy. In this connection, 
the Assembly has already adopted recommenda-
tions with a view to separating its delegations 
from those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe; your Rapporteur will return to 
these recommendations later. 
86. Consideration should also be given to the 
ideas developed in the foregoing study on a 
reform of the present functions of the WEU 
Assembly tending to give it more substantial 
powers in budget and supervisory matters. One 
should be aware, in any thinking on the need and 
possibility of creating a bicameral system of 
democratic supervision of the executive at the 
European level, that the problem concerns both 
the " community " and the intergovernmental 
spheres. Even if this question is examined on the 
assumption of the fourth (intergovernmental) 
pillar being created, it must not be forgotten that 
coherence should be maintained with the ques-
tions which will perhaps be raised in similar man-
ner in regard to the Community pillars. 
87. One must therefore repeat that the various 
proposals for the creation of a bicameral parlia-
mentary system at European level relate primari-
ly to the Community area. Such is the case for the 
proposal made by Mr. Balladur 37 for associating 
national parliaments more closely in the drafting 
of Community rules by the creation of a second 
chamber of representatives. Mr. Philippe Seguin, 
President of the French National Assembly, fol-
lows the same direction when he suggests crea-
ting a bicameral parliamentary system at Euro-
pean level where national parliaments would, 
collectively, have the rOle of a lower chamber, 
and the European Parliament that of a higher 
chamber 38• 
88. If account is to be taken of the position of 
politicians responsible for European affairs, such 
as the European Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan 
(in favour of creating a " committee of parlia-
ments "), Mr. Alain Lamassoure, French Minister 
responsible for European affairs (who is asking 
that in areas where the Union Council acts as 
legislator, each member state should be authori-
sed to be represented no longer by a minister but 
by a member of the national parliament 39 and Mr. 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing (who wishes to set up a 
37. Le Monde, 30th November 1994. 
38. For a French memorandum on Europe, Le Figaro, 7th 
December 1994. 
39. Le Figaro, 29th November 1994. 
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committee of national parliamentarians respon-
sible for supervising the policy of the European 
Central Bank 40), one is led to insist on the prero-
gatives of the national parliaments to supervise 
areas in which institutions take decisions in an 
intergovernmental framework being preserved at 
all cost and even strengthened. 
89. As revealed in a draft report on progress 
achieved in implementing the common foreign 
and security policy, presented by Mr. Matutes on 
behalf of the Foreign Affairs and Security Com-
mittee of the European Parliament on 20th April 
1995, it is beginning to be acknowledged within 
that very institution that to be effective, democra-
tic supervision must be exercised at the same level 
as the source of power 41 • Again in this report, 
bicameralism is referred to as one of the solutions 
which would enable institutional questions to be 
settled at parliamentary level 42• 
90. As to democratic supervision of the inter-
governmental pillars of the Union, Mr. Yves 
Guena, Rapporteur of the French Senate on the 
1996 reform of the institutions of the European 
Union 43, adopts the clearest possible position in 
advocating: 
" the creation of a European senate repre-
senting national parliaments and with a 
mandate to exercise control . . . over the 
various forms of intergovernmental co-ope-
ration among all or some of the member 
states ... 
The members of this Assembly would sit in 
national delegations, which naturally does 
not exclude pluralism of views or of voting; 
in this way, its composition might be adjus-
ted in accordance with the participation of 
states in the various aspects of the inter-
governmental pillars or in related forms of 
co-operation between member states. Thus 
the WEU Assembly might become one of 
the formations of the European senate, the 
one made up of parliamentary delegates of 
the WEU member states; similarly, when 
discussing the Schengen agreements, the 
European senate would be composed of the 
parliamentary delegations of the states par-
ticipating in that agreement. " 
It should be noted that the WEU Assembly is 
already identified as this body and it is left open to 
states and national parliaments to decide on pos-
sible adaptions to be made to it for it to carry out 
wider functions. 
91. Again, according to the French Senate 
report: 
40. Le Figaro, 11th January 1995. 
41. Paragraph 29 of the explanatory memorandum. 
42. Paragraph 35 of the explanatory memorandum. 
43. See footnote 32 above. 
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" It should be emphasised that a European 
senate thus conceived would not complicate 
the decision-making process of the Union. 
Its rOle would be entirely separate from that 
of the European Parliament. In reality, the 
Council of the European Union would have 
as its essential parliamentary interlocutor 
the European Parliament in the case of the 
community pillar and the European senate 
in the case of the two intergovernmental 
pillars. There would be no " shuttle " bet-
ween these two assemblies exercising diffe-
rent and complementary functions. One 
could even go so far as to state that the pro-
posed system would be a simplification as 
compared with the present situation as it 
would be based on a clear definition of the 
roles of each one, while today's institutional 
grey area between the second and third 
pillars is a source of confusion of responsi-
bilities and procedural conflicts. " 
92. These proposals are to all intents and pur-
poses very interesting even if the French Senate 
has not formulated them with a view to the incor-
poration of WEU as a fourth pillar of the Union, 
because it considers it necessary for WEU to 
remain as an organisation, admittedly closely lin-
ked to the European Union, but independent of 
the latter. The French Senate's proposals deserve 
to be examined the more carefully, given that they 
are directed towards granting a consultative role 
to the WEU Assembly without seeking to go fur-
ther. Conversely, the report in question puts for-
ward clear ideas on the composition of such a 
European senate which " should, for reasons of 
consistency, be determined in relation to the 
weighting of voting within the Council. " . . . In 
this view, " one might, for example, envisage that 
the number of members of the parliamentary dele-
gation of a state should be equal to double the 
number of votes that state has in the Council. " 
93. The method of weighting will certainly not 
be the only question that will have to be settled, 
assuming that agreement is reached on the principle 
of creating a second European chamber composed 
of delegations from national parliaments, which 
would sit alongside the European Parliament. The 
problem will also arise as to whether the delegations 
to this chamber should be different from those of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
94. It should be recalled in this connection that 
the WEU Assembly had suggested a more flexible 
solution in Recommendation 504 on the revision 
of the modified Brussels Treaty 44, by drafting the 
relevant article as follows: 
" The Council of Western European Union 
shall make an annual report on its activities 
44. Adopted on 6th June 1991 on a report presented by Mr. 
Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1261). 
to an assembly of representatives of the 
Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accor-
dance with the same criteria as representa-
tives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. " 
States Number of votes Number of votes Council European senate 
Belgium 5 10 
Denmark 3 6 
Germany 10 20 
Greece 5 10 
Spain 8 16 
France 10 20 
Ireland 3 6 
Italy 10 20 
Luxembourg 2 4 
Netherlands 5 10 
Portugal 5 10 
United Kingdom 10 20 
Austria 4 8 
Finland 3 6 
Sweden 4 8 
Hungary 5 10 
Poland 8 16 
Slovakia 3 6 
Czech Republic 5 10 
Bulgaria 5 10 
Romania 7 14 
Slovenia 2 4 
Estonia 2 4 
Latvia 2 4 
Lithuania 3 6 
95. It will be noted at the outset that the French 
Senate's concept does not follow the same criteria 
and certainly other models of bicameral systems 
can be found based on the experience of the 
various member states which have such a system. 
In any event, it is virtually unthinkable that, in a 
Europe that will soon consist of 25 member coun-
tries or more with a total population of more than 
450 million inhabitants, parliamentary supervi-
sion should be entrusted to the European Parlia-
ment alone, without national parliaments being 
represented at European level and able to exercise 
supervision over decisions taken in the intergo-
vernmental framework. 
96. Some opposition must nevertheless be 
expected to the introduction of a bicameral system 
based, on the one hand, on a European Parliament 
elected by direct universal suffrage and, on the 
other, on a second chamber composed of repre-
sentatives of national parliaments. Thus, Mr. 
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Martin, Rapporteur of the Committee on Institu-
tional Affairs of the European Parliament on the 
development of the European Union, feels that 
this initiative would amount to creating a third 
chamber alongside the (Union) Council which 
represents national governments and the Euro-
pean Parliament which represents the people. In 
his view, if it had any power at all, it would only 
make the decision-making process more cumber-
some ... If it were to have no powers at all, this 
institution would be nothing more than an expen-
sive platform. 
97. Your Rapporteur is convinced that none of 
these arguments is valid. First, the Council of the 
Union cannot be considered as a second chamber, 
even if, in the Community framework, it also acts 
as legislator. For, as legislative functions are gra-
dually transferred to the European parliamentary 
institutions, the Council will be called upon to 
legislate with increasingly less frequency. In this 
connection, Mr. Lamassoure's suggestion must be 
recalled, which advocated replacing governments 
by parliamentarians in these areas. The creation of 
a second chamber composed of representatives of 
national parliaments would not make the deci-
sion-making process more cumbersome because 
its powers would be different to those of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Even in a purely consultative 
function, this chamber might exercise essential 
political influence over the decisions of the exe-
cutive. 
98. On the other hand, Mr. Eyskens, author of a 
report in the House of Representatives of Belgium 45 
on the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference, considers the idea of creating a Euro-
pean senate to be dangerous because its introduc-
tion would institutionalise nationalist reflexes, 
hinder the operation of the European Parliament 
... and devalue the role of the latter. As the work 
of the WEU Assembly (composed of national par-
liamentarians and therefore comparable to a Euro-
pean senate) shows, this Assembly has always 
been poles apart from nationalist reflexes. Indeed, 
since it came into existence, it has steadfastly pro-
moted the creation of a European spirit, not mere-
ly among its representatives but also in the natio-
nal parliaments of the member countries. Through 
the way it operates, the Assembly, where all poli-
tical tendencies are represented, has always been 
able to develop constructive joint positions with a 
view to transmitting useful recommendations to 
the Council and giving the necessary political 
impetus to the governments the latter brings toge-
ther. It thus contributes to developing joint solu-
tions, often enabling stalemates in the Council to 
be overcome. The introduction of a European 
senate or chamber of representatives at European 
level on the model of the WEU Assembly there-
45. See paragraph 26 above. 
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fore in no way constitutes a danger; it would 
rather be an institution complementary to the 
European Parliament, which would be an indis-
pensable strengthening of the principle of repre-
sentative democracy in Europe. 
99. In this context, the debates held on this 
question at the 12th Conference of European 
Affairs Committees (CEAC) held in Paris on 27th 
and 28th February 1995 must certainly be taken 
int~ consideration. These debates were very 
vaned and dealt with subjects of interest to natio-
nal parliaments in the framework of the 1996 ins-
tituti?nal reform. The reactions of the participants 
at this conference to the proposal to establish a 
new European chamber composed of representa-
tives of national parliaments differed widely. 
Most national parliaments had not yet had the 
opportunity to examine this question in depth and 
the. conference did not reach a common position 
on It. The European Commission, in its report of 
1Oth May 1995 on the operation of the Treaty on 
European Union, was therefore wrong in stating 
that CEAC had merely brushed aside this propo-
sal. 
100. In short, your Rapporteur is inclined to 
draw the following conclusions: for the Assembly 
to argue in favour of WEU being integrated into a 
(fourth) pillar of the European Union, it must be 
assured of keeping all its present responsibilities. 
It must also have a guarantee that any problems 
raised by incorporating the provisions of the 
mo~ified Brussels Treaty into the Treaty on the 
Um<;m, due to differences in composition 
(vanable geometry) ofWEU, the European Union 
and NATO, can be resolved without dilution of 
security and that the effectiveness of this new 
pillar ":i~ !l?t u~dergo. any possible blurring of 
responsibilities, m particular due to the involve-
ment of the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment. 
101. Taking account of all the abovementioned 
problems which would have to be resolved if one 
opts for the creation of a fourth pillar of the Euro-
pean Union, it is difficult to foresee whether the 
1996 intergovernmental conference will be in a 
position to fmd solutions which are acceptable for 
all the interested parties without diluting the legal 
bases of security now in force. No doubt sharp 
disagreement can be expected not only on the 
content of the fourth pillar "defence" and wor-
king methods at executive level, but also the par-
liamentary dimension, on which it will be difficult 
to reach agreement, although the idea of a second 
parliamentary chamber at European level seems 
to be making headway. Your Rapporteur shares 
the opinion expressed in the study by the Euro-
pean Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for 
~ecurity Studies, namely that it is unlikely that the 
mtergovernmental conference will be able to 
agree on the need to redraft the two treaties and 
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assess all the effects of the different possible pro-
cedures in relation to the decision-making pro-
~ess. Wise counsel might therefore suggest that, 
m order to avoid a possible failure of the confe-
rence in this area, one should opt for a system that 
enables WEU as a whole to develop as an institu-
tion separate from the Union, but in close co-ope-
ration with it. 
(c) The development ofWEU in an autonomous 
institutional framework (United Kingdom proposal) 
102. This approach has recently been put for-
ward officially by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment 46, but it is also gaining increasing support 
among other member countries 47 and even in the 
European Commission. Having recalled that, 
among Western European countries, the United 
Kingdom and France both have specific interests 
and responsibilities overseas, the United King-
dom Prime Minister states that: 
" The government believes that the nation 
state should be the basic building block in 
constructing the kind of international order 
we wish to see; and that the nation state 
remains in particular the fundamental enti-
ty for co-operation in the field of defence. 
The defence of its citizens remains the first 
and most fundamental duty of any govern-
ment. We may choose to exercise our res-
ponsibilities through coalition action with 
our partners, but it is a national govern-
ment's duty to answer to national parlia-
ments when troops are sent into action. So 
the unshakeable conviction on which our 
approach to the development of a European 
defence policy will be based will be that the 
basis for European action in the defence 
and security field should be intergovern-
mental, based on co-operation between 
nation states. 
Future arrangements should in particular 
reflect the varying memberships of the 
European Union and WEU. WEU has nine 
(soon to be ten) full members, those states 
who are members both of the European 
Union and of NATO and are thus covered 
by NATO's defence guarantee, except for 
Denmark which has opted for observer sta-
tus. It has three associate members- Euro-
pean members of NATO who are not 
members of the European Union (Turkey 
4~. Memorandum setting out the position of the United 
Kingdom Government on how questions relating to Euro-
pean defence are to be dealt with at the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference, 1st March 1995. 
47. See, for example, the article by Mr. Balladur in Le 
Monde, 30th November 1995. 
Norway, Iceland) - who are covered by 
NATO's defence guarantee in the Washing-
ton Treaty but not by that of WEU. It has 
five observers- Denmark, plus members of 
the European Union who are not members 
of NATO (Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Aus-
tria). Denmark is covered by NATO's 
defence guarantee. The others are not cove-
red by any defence guarantee; indeed, their 
defence and security policies have traditio-
nally been neutral in orientation. Finally, 
WEU has developed an associate partner-
ship with nine states- Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. 
Congruence between the membership of 
the European Union and of WEU is thus 
not complete. In contrast to the position 
within the European Union, there is a wide 
spread of rights and responsibilities in 
WEU. 
Future structures should take account of the 
circumstances in which our armed forces 
are likely to be operating. Because the mis-
sions they undertake will not be concerned 
in the main with territorial defence, the coa-
litions of those involved will vary from 
mission to mission. Individual nations will 
decide on a case by case basis whether they 
wish to contribute forces to particular ope-
rations, taking account of military factors -
for example, the existing spread of opera-
tions to which they are committed - and 
political- for example, regional considera-
tions. Future structures must be able to 
accommodate this 'variable geometry' in 
future. Designing arrangements that can do 
so will strengthen rather than weaken the 
flexibility with which we will be able to 
respond to the challenges we face. For all 
of these reasons, the government has rejec-
ted the option of simply folding WEU into 
the European Union as an intergovernmen-
tal pillar. " 
103. The United Kingdom Government empha-
sises that: " The essential intergovernmental nature 
of decision-making on defence would be preser-
ved, with none of the involvement of the Euro-
pean Commission or the European Parliament 
which is provided for elsewhere in the European 
Union's structure; WEU already has its own 
secretariat and its own parliamentary Assembly. " 
It proposes moreover to create a new WEU autho-
rity of heads of state and of government including 
those of full member countries, associate member 
countries and observer countries. According to 
the United Kingdom memorandum: 
" This new body would provide a reinfor-
ced decision-making process for matters 
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relating to European defence and for mobi-
lising effective European military capabili-
ties. It would thus provide the necessary 
underpinning to the European Union's 
common foreign and security policy whilst 
preserving and indeed reinforcing the trans-
atlantic defence and security link. It would 
be built on the WEU Treaty base, and the 
rights and responsibilities of its members 
would thus mirror those already in force in 
the WEU Council. It would also preserve 
the opportunity for others to 'opt in' to 
WEU operations without changing their 
status, an issue which is likely to be of par-
ticular importance to those members of the 
European Union who are not members of 
NATO .... The new body would have res-
ponsibility for taking forward the definition 
of a European defence policy, as envisaged 
in the Treaty on European Union. In order 
to improve links between WEU and the 
European Union, it could meet back-to-
back with heads of state and government 
meeting in the European Council. The 
European Council, to which the WEU 
Secretary-General might be invited when it 
discusses issues affecting the European 
Union's common foreign and security policy, 
could make proposals to the new WEU 
body, which as the defence component of 
the European Union would have responsi-
bility for formulating general guidelines on 
collective European military action. " 
104. When examining this initiative, one should 
also first welcome the fact that the United King-
dom Government has taken up proposals which 
the Assembly had already made on several occa-
sions, particularly in Recommendations 556, 565 
and 566. In relation to organising WEU summits, 
the British proposal goes further than the declara-
tion adopted by the WEU Council at Noordwijk, 
under the terms of which ministers were merely 
invited to " consider the possibility of holding a 
WEU meeting at summit level before the IGC 
in order to fmalise its political input to the confe-
rence." 
105. The idea of holding WEU summit meetings 
on a more regular basis seems fully justified in 
that it would give WEU activities the political 
impetus which until now has always been lacking. 
However, if this objective is to be attained, seve-
ral questions must be raised: first, whether it is not 
more logical for the heads of state and of govern-
ment of WEU to meet before the European Coun-
cil rather than after and, second, whether it should 
not rather be envisaged that the WEU summit 
meeting should be the one to transmit proposals to 
the European Council. Indeed, the more homoge-
nous framework of WEU would enable agree-
ment to be reached more easily on an initiative in 
defence policy matters than in a European Coun-
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cil which includes five countries which do not 
participate in co-operation in defence matters in 
WEU. It is also necessary to ensure that the WEU 
observer countries cannot block within the frame-
work of the European Council any initiative put 
forward by WEU. 
106. If we insist on continuing in the present 
direction followed by the Maastricht Treaty, 
according to which WEU must act primarily at the 
request of the Union, we cannot hope to develop 
the political initiative in WEU that we also need. 
Moreover it would be more difficult to reach 
agreement in the European Council on proposals 
to be transmitted to WEU. Hence the report of the 
Council of the European Union on the functioning 
of the Treaty on European Union has to admit that 
the new possibility offered by Article J.4, para-
graph 2, has not as such been used. One of the 
aims of the revision of Title V of the Maastricht 
Treaty should therefore be to amend the text of 
paragraph 2 of Article J.4 by giving WEU a gene-
ral mandate from the Union. The article should 
therefore read as follows: 
" Western European Union (WEU), which 
is an integral part of the development of the 
Union, elaborates and implements decisions 
and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications. The Council shall, in agree-
ment with the institutions of WEU, adopt 
the necessary practical arrangements. " 
107. The United Kingdom proposal envisages 
inviting the WEU Secretary-General to attend 
meetings of the European Council when the latter 
discusses questions dealing the common foreign 
and security policy. One can but endorse this pro-
posal which is in line with the recommendations 
which the Assembly has already addressed to the 
Council in this connection. The government appa-
rently does not envisage the participation of asso-
ciate partner countries in WEU meetings at the 
level of heads of state and of government 
although observer countries will be represented 
there. One might therefore question the reasons 
for such differentiation which can be explained 
only by the desire to avoid making decision-
making too difficult through the participation of 
too many countries. However it would be desi-
rable to defme the criteria which would enable 
associate partners to participate in these meetings 
under certain conditions. 
108. Finally, it should be noted that, in point of 
fact, the United Kingdom proposal does not really 
seek to create a new authority since Article VIII, 
paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty sti-
pulates that the WEU Council can be" so organi-
sed as to be able to exercise its functions conti-
nuously ". The flexibility of this wording enables 
the member countries to be represented there at 
the level and in the way they see fit; in other 
words, it would already have been possible, in the 
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past, to organise meetings at the level of heads of 
state and of government, if the interested parties 
had demonstrated the will to do so. 
109. In summary, it might be concluded that 
there are several advantages to the British 
approach in that it permits progress to be made in 
a pragmatic and flexible way towards increasing 
cohesion between WEU and the European Union 
by deepening the experience of practical co-ope-
ration between the two institutions and their res-
pective bodies - an experience which is still fair-
ly limited. The two parts of the fortieth annual 
report of the Council to the Assembly moreover 
say nothing about the implementation of this co-
operation. In the Noordwijk declaration, the 
WEU Ministers nevertheless stressed that it was 
important to develop relations with the European 
Union. The report of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union on the working of the Treaty on 
European Union states merely that thinking will 
continue on the relations between the Secreta-
riats-General of the Council of the European 
Union and WEU. 
110. It would be particularly useful to obtain 
information on WEU's participation in the work 
of the Security Group of the CFSP and to know to 
what extent co-operation and responsibility-sha-
ring between this group and the WEU authorities 
are organised. On the basis of experience gained 
in specific areas, among which one might quote, 
for example, co-operation between WEU and the 
European Union in the administration of Mostar, 
or the creation of a group of experts of the m em-
her states of WEU, WEAG and the European 
Union with the brief of studying the options for a 
European armaments policy, one might begin to 
reflect on improvements to be made to institutio-
nal and practical co-operation; avoiding the diffi-
cult problems that would result from any form of 
institutional merger. At the same time, WEU 
might resume the revision process of its own trea-
ty which was already envisaged at the time of the 
accession of Spain and Portugal and which will 
be essential given the radical changes the securi-
ty environment has undergone since 1989. This 
revision might constitute another means for 
WEU to draw closer to the European Union and 
to develop its co-operative links with its North 
American allies in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
111. The United Kingdom memorandum seems 
therefore to be a basis for discussion and negotia-
tion between WEU member countries and the 
other partners of the European Union in the fra-
mework of the preparation of the intergovernmen-
tal conference. This document was favourably 
received by several governments at the meeting of 
the Fifteen in Carcassonne, among others, by the 
Portuguese Government which currently holds 
the presidency of the Council. 
Jv. The implications of the 1996 
intergovernmental conference 
on Euro-Atlantic relations 
112. The preliminary conclusions on the defini-
tion of a common European defence policy which 
the WEU Council transmitted to the Assembly on 
18th November 1994 48 contain the following sen-
tence: " Whatever the outcome of the IGC will be, 
the intrinsic link between a common European 
defence policy and NATO will remain. " How-
ever, at the present time, none of the information 
concerning the evolution of relations between 
WEU and NATO issued by the WEU Council 
would appear to confirm such optimism. Appa-
rently, the implementation of the decisions rea-
ched at the NATO summit meeting concerning the 
conditions for making the collective assets of 
NATO available for WEU operations is marking 
time and the application of the agreements on 
arrangements for the deployment of combined 
joint task forces by WEU is still awaited. The 
second part of the fortieth annual report of the 
Council to the Assembly 49 admits that " the 
strengthening of WEU's operational role depends 
... on NATO's elaboration of the combjned joint 
task forces (CJTF) concept. The results will be a 
test case both for WEU/NATO relations and for 
the operational potential of WEU ". Bearing in 
mind the persistent difficulties Europeans are 
having in reaching agreement with the Ameri-
cans, one might wonder why the WEU Council, in 
its Lisbon declaration, welcomed with such opti-
mism " the continuing co-operation and the insti-
tutional dialogue between WEU and NATO to 
develop further the CJTF concept ". 
113. The WEU ministers meeting in Noordwijk 
agreed it was necessary, in a spirit of transparency 
and complementarity, to intensify working rela-
tionships between the two organisations. It is even 
more important however for WEU to lose no time 
in communicating to the authorities of the Euro-
pean Union, in accordance with the WEU declara-
tion appended to the Maastricht Treaty, its conclu-
sions regarding experience gained in its relations 
with the Atlantic Alliance. It is most important to 
present to the intergovernmental conference a 
WEU concept explaining how the European 
Union, once it has a defence dimension, can beco-
me the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (a 
role reserved so far for WEU), if its members do 
not all belong to the alliance and if the European 
allies are not all members of the European Union 5°. 
In an article published in the International Herald 
48. Document 1443. 
49. Document 1453, 30th March 1995. 
50. See Chapter Vll of the study of the European Strategy 
Group and the WEU Institute for Security Studies " Towards 
a common defence policy". 
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Tribune on 30th March 1995, Mr. Kinkel, German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, set out the problem 
as follows: 
"The transatlantic partners in NATO will 
have to adapt to the European identity that 
is emerging in security and defence policy 
within the framework of Western European 
Union. 
In the context of the European Union inter-
governmental conference next year, the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
will be strengthened. A key issue on the 
transatlantic agenda will be the future mer-
ging of NATO security and defence struc-
tures with those of European integration. 
NATO must not be weakened, yet Europe 
must be given a wider scope for action on 
security matters. " 
114. It remains to be seen how this aim is to be 
achieved. This contribution is decisive in the pre-
paration of the intergovernmental conference and 
one cannot wait until 1996 to undertake this exa-
mination as it would then be far too late. WEU has 
particular responsibility in this connection since it 
is the only European organisation with a contrac-
tual link with NATO, based on Article IV of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
115. Conversely, despite the transatlantic decla-
ration of November 1990 and the organisation of 
summit meetings between the European Union, 
the United States and Canada, the transatlantic 
relations of the European Union are characterised 
more by a spirit of competition than by co-opera-
tion. Latterly, all sorts of proposals and ideas have 
emerged from the European Union authorities, 
and also on the other side of the Atlantic, advoca-
ting the establishment of transatlantic relations on 
new and wider bases, encompassing not only 
security matters, but also economic, scientific, 
cultural and other questions, over which Europe 
and North America are tending increasingly to 
fmd themselves in conflict. 
116. Discussions on the possibility of develo-
ping a new Euro-Atlantic treaty, which are not 
always very coherent, should not call into ques-
tion the bases of solidarity or the experience of 
co-operation in security and defence matters 
which have proved their worth in the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance for forty-five years. The 
contribution WEU will make, thanks to the expe-
rience acquired in its relations with NATO, will 
therefore be crucial when it comes to determining 
the way in which questions linked to future rela-
tions with our North American allies should be 
discussed and settled during the 1996 conference. 
For the time being, it is difficult to determine the 
course the Council will follow in this matter. Its 
preliminary conclusions on the defmition of a 
common European defence policy reveal only one 
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or two indications of its intentions, such as, for 
example: 
" WEU should examine developments in 
the transatlantic partnership which repre-
sent an important common interest with the 
aim of introducing joint positions agreed in 
WEU into the process of consultation in the 
alliance. 
Another aspect that could merit considera-
tion, while taking into account the parti-
cular situation of some member states, is 
the relationship between the development 
of the FAWEU planning process and the 
NATO force planning process. Equally, it is 
necessary to consider possible relations in 
times of crisis between, on the one hand, 
forces and headquarters answerable to 
WEU and, on the other hand, NATO. " 
This question is raised in even more concrete 
terms since the decision by France, Italy and 
Spain to organise a land force (EUROFOR) and a 
maritime force (EUROMARFOR) open to all 
WEU member countries, the Council having sta-
ted moreover in its Lisbon declaration of 15th 
May 1995 that these forces would be " declared 
forces answerable to WEU " (FA WEU) and 
would be employed as a priority in this frame-
work but might likewise be employed in the fra-
mework of NATO. 
117. The preliminary conclusions on the defmi-
tion of a common European defence policy also 
stress that: 
" In taking up these questions, further 
thought may also be needed on the proce-
dural aspects such as the introduction of 
WEU views into the alliance, joint meet-
ings of the respective Councils, and other 
working relationships such as enhanced co-
operation between civilian and military ins-
titutions (secretariats, HQs, staffs). These 
questions have become even more topical 
in the light of the new tasks of NATO in 
the field of crisis-management, including 
peace-keeping. " 
118. However, it is not only a matter of procedu-
ral questions. One essential issue which must be 
examined is that of consistency between the secu-
rity guarantee offered by Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, involving the nuclear umbrel-
la and the full power of the United States, and that 
offered by Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, which is legally more binding than that of 
the Washington Treaty. Not only is this question 
of decisive importance in the context of the sha-
ring of responsibilities and costs between the two 
organisations (the United Kingdom, for example, 
considers that NATO should concentrate on the 
defence of Europe and WEU on the " Petersberg " 
missions, while others feel that WEU's responsi-
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bilities cannot be reduced solely to the tasks deri-
ving from Article V), it also plays a vital role 
when it comes to tackling the problems of the 
enlargement of WEU, NATO and the European 
Union. 
119. The question of sharing responsibilities 
between Europeans and Americans in the conduct 
of international affairs was again aired when, 
during their meeting in Carcassonne, the ministers 
of the Fifteen suggested that the Atlantic Alliance 
offer Russia a special co-operation agreement in 
security matters, the content of which has not 
been clearly defmed -reference has been made to 
a charter or a treaty which includes a reciprocal 
non-aggression undertaking. This initiative is 
situated primarily in the context of the enlarge-
ment of NATO to the East and closely linked to 
that of the European Union and WEU. In an initial 
reaction to this initiative the Secretary-General of 
NATO made clear that he could not imagine a 
member of the European Union becoming a full 
member of WEU without being a member of 
NAT0 51• 
V. The problems of enlargement 
120. At a colloquy held in Prague on 20th and 
21st February 1995 at the invitation of the Parlia-
ment of the Czech Republic, the defmition of 
WEU's future policy towards associate partner 
countries with a view to preparing the 1996 inter-
governmental conference was the central subject 
of interest to participants. On this occasion, the 
permanent representative of Portugal to the Coun-
cil of WEU - Portugal currently holds the presi-
dency of the Council - set out the problems that 
will be raised in this context as follows: 
" ... As to the future development of rela-
tions between WEU and associate partners, 
I can only speak for my own country. For 
the time being, the Permanent Council does 
not envisage any strengthening of the pre-
sent status. This does not mean the position 
of the associate partners will not change in 
the future. However, as you know, there are 
two aspects to the process of European 
integration- widening and deepening- and 
as 1996 approaches, the time has come to 
give priority to this matter. The fmal stage 
of their convergence with WEU is, natural-
ly, accession to the modified Brussels Trea-
ty, once they have completed the process of 
joining NATO and the European Union. 
They might also become observers if they 
do not wish to have full member status. 
This is the choice the Maastricht declara-
tion offers European Union members. 
51. Le Soir, 5th April1995. 
However, it is also possible that, before 
acquiring full member status, associate 
partners might become associate members 
of WEU. This possibility will depend on 
the timing on the expansion of NATO to 
include the countries of Central Europe. 
Indeed, WED's Maastricht declaration also 
provides that the European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance may become associate 
members of WEU if they so wish. 
Enlargement should contribute to stability 
and peace in Europe and should not, under 
any circumstances, create new, artificial 
borders on our continent. This means that 
enlargement must be accompanied by 
mechanisms for increased co-operation 
with the CIS countries, particularly with 
Russia and Ukraine. 
Enlargement should not weaken the stabili-
sing rOle of the European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions in international politics in gen-
eral and European affairs in particular. 
Finally, the enlargement of NATO and 
WEU, for which the rationale is, in each 
case, different, must maintain the consis-
tency of the defence guarantee provided 
under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
and Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The best solution would be no doubt 
concomitant of the two alliances. But if this 
solution is not possible, the two organisa-
tions should agree, prior to their respective 
enlargement, on mechanisms to safeguard 
the effectiveness of the two defensive 
alliances and coherence between the Atlan-
tic Alliance and its European pillar, WEU. I 
have no answers or certainties in this 
connection, but I believe we are all in 
agreement on the need to avoid, at all cost, 
the present interlocking institutions beco-
ming interblocking institutions. " 
121. It is obvious that the associate partner 
countries are seeking, first and foremost, a securi-
ty guarantee - and this is the heart of the problem. 
At the colloquy, the Director of the WEU Institu-
te for Security Studies, Mr. John Roper, made the 
following observation regarding the present situa-
tion of associate partners: 
" It is of course still to be seen what is the 
nature of the assurance of a non-contractual 
nature which can be provided to countries 
prior to them becoming full members of the 
alliance and/or WEU. This may be a politi-
cal rather than contractual guarantee but to 
some extent, the assurance that an attack on 
the integrity of a country will seriously 
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affect the future of political relations bet-
ween any aggressor and the group of allies 
formerly linked within WEU or the Atlan-
tic Alliance may have a significant deter-
rent effect. While of course it is not as 
strong as the military guarantee provided 
by membership of an integrated defence 
organisation -it has significant value. " 
122. For as long as the Atlantic Alliance, gover-
ned by a policy of giving " priority to Russia ", 
desisted from any concrete initiative leading to 
NATO membership for the Central European 
countries, the problem of enlargement essentially 
boiled down to establishing parallelism between 
WED's expansion and that of the European 
Union. In this parallel process, WEU had in fact 
moved ahead of the European Union in its policy 
towards the East by drawing the Baltic countries 
into the circle of associate partners, without wait-
ing for the European Union to negotiate Europe 
agreements with them 52• 
123. Regarding the ways and means of estab-
lishing such parallelism between WEU and the 
European Union, your Rapporteur shares the opi-
nion expressed by Mr. Soell at the colloquy held 
on 17th October 1994 when he stated: 
" Certainly it is essential to establish a close 
link, particularly with the European Union, 
the more so that under the terms of the 
Maastricht Treaty, WEU shall be an inte-
gral part of the development of that Union. 
Let us not forget either that the modified 
Brussels Treaty itself invites the contrac-
ting parties to encourage the progressive 
integration of Europe. An important ques-
tion therefore now arises about the criteria 
according to which this parallel progression 
is to be achieved. On this point, I take the 
view that the pursuit of more extensive 
relations between WEU and its associate 
partners cannot depend exclusively on their 
degree of integration in the European 
Union. This would mean in effect that the 
security concerns of these states and our 
own security interests would be subordina-
ted to other considerations which prevail in 
the framework of the European Union. This 
can at times go as far as making security 
matters the pretext for holding back on 
progress in other areas. This we cannot 
tolerate ... " 
Your Rapporteur therefore believes that estab-
lishing parallelism between the enlargement of 
WEU and that of the European Union should not 
become a means of preventing WEU members 
from deciding, if they so wish, to invite one or 
more Central European countries to accede to the 
52. See the report by Mr. Soell on a European security 
policy, Document 1439, lOth November 1994. 
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modified Brussels Treaty in accordance with the 
criteria embodied in the latter. 
124. However, it is necessary from now on to 
harmonise WEU's approach to enlargement with 
both the European Union and NATO, since the 
latter - under a new American political impetus -
has accelerated the process of enlarging NATO. 
During the Political Committee's visit to 
Washington from 6th to 8th March 1995, Penta-
gon representatives clearly intimated that the Uni-
ted States wished that any country becoming a full 
member of WEU should also be a member of 
NATO. Otherwise, a dangerous situation might 
arise where a country admitted only to WEU 
might, by a circuitous route, benefit from a NATO 
guarantee. 
125. This attitude of the Pentagon runs counter 
to the declaration of the WEU member countries 
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty which links 
accession to WEU to membership of the Euro-
pean Union, not of NAT0s3• This issue is there-
fore of interest not only to the Central European 
countries but also to Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
which have just joined the European Union. 
These three countries have chosen to become 
observers in WEU but doubts remain as to whe-
ther the WEU Council had really given them a 
choice between full membership and observer sta-
tus. For that reason, Mr. de Puig, the Chairman of 
the Political Committee, put Written Question 
329 to the Council in order to determine the man-
ner in which the latter had invited the three coun-
tries to consolidate their relations with WEU. 
126. In its answer, transmitted to the Assembly 
on 24th February 1995, the Council stated that: 
" The Chairman-in-Office of the WEU 
Council of Ministers, recalling the offers 
made in the WEU declaration of Maastricht 
of lOth December 1991, invited the Repu-
blic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and 
the Kingdom of Sweden, in the light of 
their ratification of the Treaty of Accession 
to the European Union, to state their inten-
tions with respect to their relations with 
WEU. 
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden replied to the 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of 
Ministers by confrrming their desire to 
become observers. 
The first meeting of the WEU Council in 
1995 took place on lOth January and was 
53. A WEU member state has stated its opposition to acces-
sion by a country which has not at the same time applied to 
join the Atlantic Alliance, in order to maintain identity bet-
ween WEU and the European pillar of the alliance. (See the 
study by the European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies, Chapter V). 
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marked by the attendance of the new mem-
bers of the European Union- Austria, Fin-
land and Sweden. 
Austria and Sweden were formally welco-
med as observers. Finland, which has yet to 
fmalise its internal procedures regarding its 
observer status, attended the Council on an 
informal basis. " 
127. In the meantime, the Finnish Government 
has informed WEU that the parliamentary proce-
dure has been completed and " the invitation to 
Finland to become an observer in Western Euro-
pean Union" has been accepted. This sentence 
might again raise doubts over the content of 
WEU's invitation, but the Council's answer to the 
question put by Mr. de Puig refers to the WEU 
declaration of 1Oth December 1991, clarifying 
that the content of that declaration is still valid. 
Consequently, Austria, Finland and Sweden can 
still be asked to become party to the Brussels 
Treaty without being members of NATO or be 
invited to do so by the WEU Council itself. 
128. Matters seem more complicated in relation 
to the Central European countries and calls for the 
accession of these countries to WEU and to 
NATO to be synchronised 54 are being heard with 
increasing frequency, while opinion in other quar-
ters is against a rapid enlargement of NATO ss. 
Moreover, there is no common approach in the 
United States on the criteria for admitting these 
countries to NATO. Whereas the Pentagon appears 
to be advocating a case by case approach, rather 
than by groups of states, the American Congress 
is preparing, in its draft bill HR7, entitled" Natio-
nal security revitalisation act " - which has been 
adopted by the House of Representatives but not 
yet by the Senate - to identify priority groups of 
states such as the four Visegrad states, at the same 
time fixing a series of criteria and conditions for 
the admission of these countries, which must spe-
cifically: 
"(a) meet appropriate standards, inclu-
ding: 
(i) shared values and interests; 
(ii) democratic governments; 
(iii) free market economies; 
(iv) civilian control of the military, 
of the police, and of the intelli-
gence and other security ser-
vices, so that these organisa-
tions do not pose a threat to 
democratic institutions, neigh-
54. See, for example, Mr. Riihe in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 31st January 1995, Mr. Rifkind in Siiddeutsche Zei-
tung, 6th February 1995 and the analysis of the group of 
experts of the European Commission, 19th December 1994. 
55. See Klaus Kinkel in Die Welt, 6th February 1995. 
bouring countries, or the secu-
rity of NATO or the United 
States; 
(v) adherence to the rule of law 
and to the values, principles 
and political commitments set 
forth in the Helsinki Final Act 
and other declarations by the 
members of the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe; 
(vi) commitment to further the 
principles of NATO and to 
contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic area; 
(vii) commitment and ability to 
accept the obligations, respon-
sibilities and costs of NATO 
membership; and 
(viii) commitment and ability to 
implement infrastructure deve-
lopment activities that will 
facilitate participation in and 
support for NATO military 
activities; and 
(b) remain committed to protecting the 
rights of all their citizens and respec-
ting the territorial integrity of their 
neighbours. " 
129. It should be noted in this connection that 
the stage of development that the countries 
concerned have reached in their relations with the 
European Union and with WEU does not feature 
among the criteria listed in this bill, nor does their 
membership of the Council of Europe, which 
must be considered as the principal guardian of 
the principles of democracy and human rights in 
Europe. At the American Department of State, on 
the contrary, an integral concept seems to be 
advocated, envisaging synchronised incorpora-
tion of the Central European countries into the 
overall range of international security organisa-
tions in the widest sense, with a view to creating a 
kind of network of relations. Moreover, in a recent 56 
contribution, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, Secretary 
of State for European Affairs at the American 
State Department, listed the following criteria: 
" - NATO expansion must strengthen 
security in the entire region, including 
nations that are not members. 
- The rationale and process for NATO's 
expansion will be transparent, not secret. 
- There is no timetable or list of nations 
that will be invited to join NATO. 
56. International Herald Tribune, 15th March 1995. 
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These will emerge as the process 
moves forward. 
- Each nation will be considered indivi-
dually, not as part of some grouping: 
- No outside nation will exercise a veto. 
- As was the case in the original 
Washington Treaty, new members 
must be democratic, have market eco-
nomies, be committed to responsible 
security policies and be able to contri-
bute to the alliance. As President Clin-
ton has stated, 'countries with repressi-
ve political systems, countries with 
designs on their neighbours, countries 
with militaries unchecked by civilian 
control or with closed economic sys-
tems need not apply. ' 
- Each new NATO member constitutes 
for the United States the most solemn 
of commitments: a bilateral defence 
treaty that extends the United States 
security umbrella to a new nation. This 
requires ratification by two-thirds of 
the United States Senate, a point that is 
often overlooked. " 
Conversely, Mr. William Perry, United States 
Defence Secretary, recently stated 57 that he was 
against setting out explicit criteria for joining 
NATO: 
" Establishing rigid and detailed criteria 
could lead to misunderstandings and recri-
minations between NATO and disappoin-
ted candidates when NATO does admit new 
members. It could place the alliance in the 
difficult position of rendering explicit, 
public judgments on the fitness of other 
nations in such sensitive areas as their 
commitment to democracy and to a free 
market." 
In Europe too, a diversity of concepts can be 
noted, among which are to be found, for example, 
that of dividing the Central European countries 
into three circles, the frrst encompassing Poland 
and the Baltic countries, the second the Visegrad 
countries and the third the Balkan states 58• 
130. Moreover, account must be taken of the 
fact that any enlargement of NATO to the East 
will require an equitable arrangement with Rus-
sia, even though it is constantly repeated that this 
country will have neither a right of regard nor of 
veto in this context. The West's hesitancy, since 
the creation of the partnership for peace, in clearly 
defining its concepts in this area and its lack of 
57. NATO enlargement, USIS, 23rd March 1995. 
58. See Thierry de Montbrial in Le Figaro, 7th February 
1995. 
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cohesion over the choice of criteria to be followed 
would appear to indicate that this process will be 
extremely lengthy. There will also be, in the line 
of argument suggesting that this process should be 
synchronised with that of the European Union and 
WEU, the danger referred to by the representative 
of the Chairmanship-in-Office in Prague that the 
present interlocking institutions might become 
interblocking institutions. 
131. It will be necessary for the WEU Council to 
consider the implications of this situation. In its 
declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, 
WEU fixed precise criteria for defining the condi-
tions under which applicant countries might acce-
de to the modified Brussels Treaty or become 
associate members. The success of the stability 
pact will considerably reinforce homogeneity 
among the Central European countries, once the 
problems with their neighbours that still exist bet-
ween a number of them have been settled. It 
would not be in the security interest of Western 
Europe to impose unduly demanding conditions 
and to place obstacles that are difficult to over-
come before applicant countries can join WEU. It 
is therefore necessary, starting from the criteria 
laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty, to fmd 
the right balance between the interests of the pre-
sent member countries, for which any great 
increase in the number of participants should not 
run counter to the aims of the treaty and hinder 
their implementation, and the legitimate interests 
of the newly democratic countries in not being 
excluded from a security system from which to 
date only Western European countries benefit. For 
the security of the latter would also be affected if 
an area of lesser security were to be established 
east of their borders for any length of time. 
132. However, it seems that for some time the 
WEU Council has defmitely been back-pedalling 
in regard to the future development of its relations 
with the countries that have become associate 
partners. The first part of the fortieth annual report 
of the Council 59 still claims that by the creation of 
the status of associate partner, " WEU is ... in the 
forefront of the process of preparing for the acces-
sion of these states to the Union and, as a conse-
quence, to WEU ". However now that the status 
of associate partner has been established, there is 
a clear impression that the enlargement of WEU 
towards Central Europe has no longer the same 
urgency for the Council of this organisation as for 
the European Union and for NATO. The synchro-
nisation of the rapprochement between the coun-
tries of Western Europe and western institutions 
increasingly depends on considerations voiced in 
NATO; the number of political leaders advocating 
that no country should join WEU without at 
the same time joining NATO or already being a 
59. Document 1433, 9th November 1995. 
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member is increasing. It can therefore be noted 
that WEU is moving further and further away 
from the declaration annexed to the Maastricht 
Treaty according to which " states which are 
members of the European Union are invited to 
accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in 
accordance with Article XI of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, or to become observers if they so 
wish". If membership of NATO by the countries 
concerned became the essential factor of the 
" conditions to be agreed ", one would therefore 
be implicitly giving the United States a right of 
veto over any enlargement of WEU towards Cen-
tral Europe. 
133. This was not the initial intention of the 
WEU member governments for in that case it 
would have been more honest to state in the above 
mentioned declaration that the member states of 
the European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance 
were invited to join WEU. If any enlargement of 
WEU must depend on the extent to which NATO 
is expanded, a matter to which the United States 
appears to be giving priority, is there not then a 
contradiction in American policy, which is see-
king, on the one hand, to extend NATO's security 
guarantees to an as yet ill-defmed number of Cen-
tral European countries and tending, on the other 
hand, towards a progressive withdrawal from 
European security and defence matters? 
134. It is clear that the extension of NATO to the 
east will raise various difficult problems as long 
as the new purpose of NATO and its relations with 
Russia are not clearly defmed. In the absence of 
such defmition, extension might indeed cause a 
further split which everyone is anxious to avoid. 
However, NATO's problems should not be an 
obstacle to the rapprochement of the countries of 
Central Europe with Western Europe since the 
integration of these countries in the European 
Union and WEU does not create a split or any 
kind of threat to Russia. Conversely, it should not 
be forgotten that, while Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty imposes a very binding obligation 
on all its signatories to help any one of them that 
might be the object of an armed attack, WEU is 
not designed to carry out large scale defensive 
action by itself, which obliges it to take maximum 
account of NATO requirements and in particular 
those of the Americans who do not wish at any 
price to fmd themselves engaged in a major 
conflict by a decision of their allies in which they 
have not been involved. 
135. It is therefore understandable that WEU 
should hesitate to consider extending the guaran-
tee offered under Article V to countries that are 
not members of the alliance. It would nevertheless 
be possible for it to proceed by stages. From 
declarations made by certain representatives of 
associate partner countries during meetings of the 
Political Committee, it appears that their main 
objective is not to obtain a security guarantee 
from WEU but above all to be considered as res-
ponsible partners, capable of making their contri-
bution to a wider Europe with a view to being full 
members. It is therefore time for the Council to 
consider seriously whether it is not possible to 
envisage granting associate partner countries the 
status of associate member here and now. If it is 
possible to give this status to European NATO 
countries that are not members of the European 
Union, why should it not be possible to give a 
similar status to countries whose accession to 
NATO is not yet guaranteed but whose member-
ship of the European Union is already agreed in 
principle? A step such as this, apart from the sub-
stantial encouragement it would give to the coun-
tries in question, would also strengthen cohesion 
between Western European countries and Central 
Europe in security and defence matters. 
VI. A strategy for the way forward 
136. It will be necessary to determine clearly and 
coherently WEU's aims in terms of its future role 
in the system of international organisations before 
the group of experts establi~hed by the European 
Union begins its work. This step is essential not 
only in the interests of European security but also 
because public expression of WEU's ideas is a 
question of its survival. As the smallest organisa-
tion with the most modest resources, particularly 
in operational terms, there is a risk of it being cru-
shed between the European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance, both of which have powerful structures 
and means. Although the raison d'etre of the Euro-
pean and Atlantic organisations may not be an end 
in itself, it is the existence of WEU alone that is 
constantly called into question, because neither 
public opinion nor even political leaders have a 
clear idea of its role and functions. 
137. It should however suffice to repeat that the 
modified Brussels Treaty has defined its aims and 
tasks in a clear and precise manner. After having 
transferred the implementation of certain tasks 
covered by the treaty to other organisations, it will 
be necessary for the Council to draw up a list of 
the provisions of the treaty whose execution must 
remain within its area of responsibility, at least in 
the foreseeable future, explaining publicly the 
reasons why these tasks cannot be carried out by 
the European Union or by the Atlantic Alliance. 
138. In the preliminary conclusions on the for-
mulation of a common European defence policy 
published in Noordwijk last November, the Coun-
cil did useful work in defming the main areas of 
responsibility and interest common to WEU 
member countries. WEU might perfectly well 
base its contribution to the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference on these factors. Given their signi-
ficance, it is appropriate to include them here: 
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" - WEU governments have a direct res-
ponsibility for the security and defence 
of their own peoples and territories; 
- WEU governments have a responsibil-
ity to project the security and stability 
presently enjoyed in the West through-
out the whole of Europe; 
- WEU governments have an interest, in 
order to reinforce European security, in 
fostering stability in the southern 
Mediterranean countries; 
- WEU governments are ready to take on 
their share of the responsibility for the 
promotion of security, stability and the 
values of democracy in the wider 
world, including through the execution 
of peace-keeping and other crisis-
management measures under the 
authority of the United Nations Securi-
ty Council or the CSCE, acting either 
independently or through WEU or 
NATO. They are also ready to address 
new security challenges such as huma-
nitarian emergencies; proliferation; ter-
rorism; international crime and envi-
ronmental risks, including those related 
to disarmament and the destruction of 
nuclear and chemical weapons: 
- Europeans have a major responsibility 
with regard to defence in both the 
conventional and nuclear field. In addi-
tion to their role of national deterrent, 
the British and French nuclear wea-
pons contribute to global deterrence in 
accordance with ... The Hague plat-
form of WEU of 1987. " 
More specifically, as far as the WEU Assembly is 
concerned, this must remain the primary element 
for strengthening representative democratic 
supervision in security and defence matters. As 
your Rapporteur has explained in the section 
devoted to this question, it is essential that the 
Council endorse this concept of parliamentary 
supervision and support it in its contacts with 
other European authorities. 
139. There are certainly good reasons why the 
analysis of the risks and threats to Europe under-
taken in the context of the first part of the white 
paper on European security should be conducted 
in a Council with 27 countries present. However, 
this analysis should produce practical responses 
and a coherent concept of the organisation of col-
lective European security and defence; such a 
concept would give a decisive impetus and direc-
tion for both the European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance. This being so, should not the decisions 
to be taken in the second phase of the work on this 
white paper be reserved for a Council limited to 
full members, which would however take into 
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account associate members' points of view? This 
undertaking should indeed serve as an example 
and show that it is from a homogenous and deter-
mined group such as WEU that political impetus 
should emanate. The WEU member countries will 
thus be able to prove that they are the European 
hard core in security and defence matters and are 
capable of showing the way to countries belon-
ging to the wider circle of the European Union. 
To this end, the WEU Assembly is fully prepared 
to co-operate with the Council in a kind of joint 
venture. 
140. However, to ensure the success of this 
enterprise, member governments of WEU and all 
its executive bodies will need to bring about a 
fundamental change of direction in their political 
will. The concept of the Maastricht Treaty where-
by political impetus must be given by the wider 
and less homogenous circle (the European Union) 
to the smaller, more homogenous circle (WEU) is 
not realistic, as experience has shown before and 
after this treaty came into effect. 
141. While the Union, by its nature and its 
methods of operation, is incapable of intervening 
or giving a valid mandate to WEU in defence mat-
ters, the Maastricht Treaty limits WEU's possibi-
lities in these matters through Article J.4, para-
graph 5, which stipulates that co-operation in the 
framework of WEU (on the basis of the modified 
Brussels Treaty) must not run counter to or hinder 
that provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. This 
intolerable situation has promoted a very wide-
spread " wait and see " mentality in the ministe-
rial departments responsible for WEU matters 
which is putting a brake on a substantial number 
of WEU's political initiatives. 
142. This is one of the reasons why certain ini-
tiatives with a bearing on what is properly WEU's 
area of responsibility do not proceed from the lat-
ter but from the European Union, as illustrated by 
the approach undertaken by the 15 at Carcassonne, 
who, after doubtless hasty consideration, invited 
NATO to propose a special arrangement to Russia. 
Relations with NATO are in effect primarily the 
responsibility of WEU. 
143. Therefore let us repeat once again: it is first 
of all necessary to generate the necessary political 
will in WEU for that organisation to become the 
political driving force in those areas for which it 
has responsibility. It is then necessary to draw the 
consequences at institutional level by putting an 
end to the ambiguities of paragraphs 2 and 5 of 
Article J.4 which restrict WEU's activities in an 
intolerable and unrealistic way. In this connection, 
the United Kingdom memorandum might provide 
an interesting working basis since it recognises the 
needs of WEU in terms of political impetus. 
144. The intergovernmental conference should 
lead to WEU being recognised as the hard core of 
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the Union in security and defence matters in 
which it acts on behalf of the Union for a transi-
tory period, with all members of the Union that 
are not members of WEU having the possibility of 
being associated with WEU actions without being 
able to block consensus reached in this frame-
work. 
145. Furthermore, WEU must endeavour to 
develop a unity which operates as a true political 
driving force and at the same time guarantees the 
continuity of its action. In this connection, consi-
deration should specifically be given to the propo-
sal of the high-level group of experts set up by Mr. 
van den Broek with the aim of creating a central 
analysis and evaluation capability with the neces-
sary study and information means ... led by a poli-
tical personality and having sufficient authority, 
independence and duration. This proposal 
concerns, of course, the whole range of responsi-
bilities of the CFSP. Now, given that the member-
ship of the CFSP and of WEU is not identical, it 
will be difficult to work out how to create one and 
the same analysis unit for both. Consequently, as 
the WEU Assembly has already recommended 
several times, the political powers of the WEU 
Secretary-General should first be considerably 
strengthened. 
146. As to the harmonisation of the presidencies 
of the European Union and WEU, the matter is 
not urgent as long as " variable geometry " conti-
nues to be a characteristic of all the European ins-
titutions. It is much more important for WEU to 
speed up its efforts to become truly operational, 
for as long as it is not operational, it will be prac-
tically unable to take any specific action towards 
shouldering its responsibilities and achieving its 
aims, as summarised at Noordwijk. Moreover, at 
operational level, WEU is in a position to prove 
that the principles of consensus and intergovern-
mental co-operation which govern it can lead per-
fectly well to considerable progress being made in 
developing a common policy. Indeed it would be 
mistaken to believe that the determination of the 
member states to harmonise their interests and 
contribute to consensus in defence matters can be 
strengthened by their fear of fmding themselves, 
under certain circumstances, in the minority or 
even totally deprived of decision-making powers. 
147. Monetary union has been achieved by 
stages and according to specific criteria which had 
to be met in order to participate. Following this 
model, WEU member countries might agree to 
establish a common defence in successive stages, 
but such an undertaking should be pursued so as 
to avoid increasing the number of variable geo-
metry circles that exist in Europe. 
148. As to relations between the Council and the 
Assembly, the Council should affirm more clearly 
that the WEU Assembly is the only parliamentary 
assembly to which it is responsible, in accordance 
with the treaties in force. In face of the European 
Parliament's efforts to establish direct contact 
with the WEU Council and its Secretary-General, 
it is essential for the Council to take a clear, publi-
cly visible stance, showing that its parliamentary 
interlocutor is the WEU Assembly. The clarity of 
its position should also be evident in the manner 
in which it fulfils the obligation placed on it by 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty to keep 
the Assembly informed of its activities. The 
Assembly assesses all the detailed information it 
regularly receives in the annual reports of the 
Council on the activities of its different working 
groups. However, it must be recalled that the dia-
logue between the Assembly and the Council is of 
a political nature and that it is therefore essential 
for the annual report to give more information on 
political guidelines in order to stimulate a fruitful 
exchange. 
149. Furthermore, the information given by the 
Council is not always consistent and complete. 
Hence one must wonder why the Western Euro-
pean Armaments Group (WEAG), whose activi-
ties are reported by the Council in its fortieth 
annual report, does not appear on the organogram 
of the ministerial organs transmitted to the 
Assembly by the Secretary-General in November 
1994. Conversely, the same organogram shows a 
verification group whose existence is not mentio-
ned in this annual report. Nor does it mention the 
creation, the aims or the activities of a group of 
military delegates set up by the Council. 
150. Conversely, the Assembly noted with inter-
est the transfer to WEU of certain Eurogroup 
functions, particularly public relations activities 
and the existence of a Council working group on 
transatlantic public relations currently chaired 
by the United Kingdom. The Assembly itself 
attaches particular importance to making informa-
tion concerning WEU more widely available on 
the other side of the Atlantic and wishes to be 
associated with this. It therefore deeply regrets 
that the Council should have decided to organise 
an important conference in Washington in June in 
the framework of its transatlantic public relations 
activities, with a major participation of WEU 
ministers, while the Assembly's plenary session is 
to be held on exactly those same dates. Moreover, 
no invitation to this event has been issued to any 
member of the Assembly. This is hardly the way 
for the Council to demonstrate its willingness to 
respect the Assembly's work and improve rela-
tions with it. 
151. What is more, from time to time it is noti-
ceable that the ministerial organs are not keeping 
the Assembly informed of some of their activities 
or of those of their subsidiary bodies. Hence the 
Assembly has never been informed of the content 
of a speech by the WEU Secretary-General at the 
last CSCE (now OSCE) summit meeting in Buda-
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pest, whereas this speech has been published by 
the services of the European Parliament. 
152. Most surprising of all, the Council at no 
time informed the Assembly that the Government 
of Greece, when it transmitted the instrument of 
ratification of the protocol of accession of the 
Hellenic Republic to the modified Brussels Trea-
ty, made a declaration to the effect that the Helle-
nic Government excluded from the competence of 
the International Court of Justice any dispute over 
the Hellenic Republic taking defensive military 
measures for reasons of national defence. For this 
reason, on 26th April1995, Mr. Cuco put Written 
Question 330 to the Council as follows: 
"Does the Council consider that it is law-
ful, when ratifying an international agree-
ment, for a reservation to be made which 
should normally have been included in the 
protocol of accession itself, since such 
reservation, unilaterally modifying Article 
X of the modified Brussels Treaty, cannot 
acquire validity without the signature and 
ratification of all the other contracting 
parties?" 
153. At the present juncture, it is of prime 
importance for WEU as a whole to assert itself in 
the face of the new risks threatening European 
security and the problems raised by harmonising 
positions and interests of European countries and 
institutions with a view to the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference and it is essential for the Coun-
cil and the Assembly to follow the same course. 
The risk of disagreement between the Assembly 
and the Council will be the less if the Council pro-
vides the Assembly with more information on its 
activities and its political guidelines and also on 
the problems it is encountering in achieving its 
aims. 
VII. Conclusions 
154. While the various institutions of the Euro-
pean Union and also member governments, par-
liaments, political groups and research institutes 
are in the process of drafting their studies and 
contributions to the preparation of the work of the 
group of experts on the revision of the Maastricht 
Treaty, it is perhaps too soon to draw fmal conclu-
sions. 
155. Faced with the prevailing uncertainty on 
the periphery of Europe, in particular regarding 
the evolution of the internal situation in Russia 
and also the development of crisis flashpoints on 
the territory of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, the disturbing inability of the interna-
tional community to bring under control the bloody 
conflict raging in the Balkans only hours away 
from the main European capitals, and the fearful 
violence of religious extremism which is occur-
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ring with increasing frequency on Europe's sou-
them perimeter, there is a growing conviction that 
it is of the utmost importance to maintain and 
consolidate the smooth running of the European 
and transatlantic institutions, regarded as anchors 
of stability and security. 
156. In the search for a new security order in 
Europe, all organisations concerned, and foremost 
among them the European Union, WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance, must adapt in order to meet the 
challenges arising from the radical upheavals in 
the international situation since 1989, and in parti-
cular the heavy pressure exerted upon them by the 
applicant countries that are knocking at their door. 
Under such circumstances, one has to wonder 
what the aim of the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence will be. It seems more important to move 
towards consolidating and improving the present 
mechanisms for guaranteeing the security of our 
citizens than to seek at all costs to overcome diffe-
rences in ideological vision as to the purpose of a 
United Europe, or to bridge the gap between those 
in favour of a community Europe with a federal 
structure and advocates of the primacy of the 
nation state in deciding major political questions. 
157. More specifically, as far as security and 
defence questions are concerned, any attempt 
radically to change the method of operation of the 
defence system and put it on an entirely new 
contractual basis is likely to lead to the failure of 
the conference. WEU still needs time to become 
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truly operational and develop its capabilities. It 
should therefore be able to operate autonomously. 
In parallel, it must develop more practical proce-
dures for improving co-operation with a CFSP 
that will perhaps develop more rapidly in a com-
munity direction, without abandoning the prin-
ciple that it must continue to be directed by an 
intergovernmental decision-making body and not 
by the European Commission. 
158. Regarding democratic supervision of the 
European executive, a clearer distinction should 
be made between questions within the community 
purview and those that are an intergovernmental 
responsibility. A cut and dried solution, according 
to which all community matters would be the res-
ponsibility of the European Parliament, and all 
intergovernmental matters would be entrusted to a 
second chamber composed of representatives of 
national parliaments would probably be inappli-
cable. On the one hand, the national parliaments 
are already demanding increased participation in 
matters falling within the community process and 
are asking, for example, to ensure supervision of 
the principle of subsidiarity, while, on the other 
hand, the European Parliament is seeking to exer-
cise a greater influence on questions relating to 
the CFSP as the latter develops in a community 
direction. In any event, however, during the 1996 
conference, it will be essential to seek recognition 
of the need for a second chamber in order to com-
plete the European parliamentary dimension. 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration 
and collective self-defence, 
signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, 
as amended by the Protocol modifying and 
completing the Brussels Treaty 
signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 
Article XII 
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The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as 
possible with the Belgian Government. 
It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall there-
after remain in force for fifty years. 
After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the right 
to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denuncia-
tion to the Belgian Government. 
The North Atlantic Treaty 
Washington, D.C., 4th April1949 
Article 13 
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one year after 
its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will 
inform the governments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. 
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